12 ideas
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
7401 | Heat and colour don't exist, so cannot mislead about the external world [Galileo, by Tuck] |
5454 | Tastes, odours and colours only reside in consciousness, and would disappear with creatures [Galileo] |
21513 | We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing] |
21497 | If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing] |
16560 | Galileo introduced geometrico-mechanical explanation, based on Archimedes [Galileo, by Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
18671 | The ground for an attitude is not a thing's 'goodness', but its concrete characteristics [Ewing] |
3645 | To understand the universe mathematics is essential [Galileo] |
19673 | Galileo mathematised movement, and revealed its invariable component - acceleration [Galileo, by Meillassoux] |