79 ideas
| 3348 | If phenomenology is deprived of the synthetic a priori, it is reduced to literature [Benardete,JA on Husserl] |
| 15570 | Phenomenology is the science of essences - necessary universal structures for art, representation etc. [Husserl, by Polt] |
| 7614 | Bracketing subtracts entailments about external reality from beliefs [Husserl, by Putnam] |
| 6893 | Phenomenology aims to describe experience directly, rather than by its origins or causes [Husserl, by Mautner] |
| 22216 | Phenomenology studies different types of correlation between consciousness and its objects [Husserl, by Bernet] |
| 21217 | Phenomenology needs absolute reflection, without presuppositions [Husserl] |
| 22218 | There can only be a science of fluctuating consciousness if it focuses on stable essences [Husserl, by Bernet] |
| 22217 | Phenomenology aims to validate objects, on the basis of intentional intuitive experience [Husserl, by Bernet] |
| 22219 | Husserl saw transcendental phenomenology as idealist, in its construction of objects [Husserl, by Bernet] |
| 22204 | Start philosophising with no preconceptions, from the intuitively non-theoretical self-given [Husserl] |
| 22207 | Epoché or 'bracketing' is refraining from judgement, even when some truths are certain [Husserl] |
| 22208 | 'Bracketing' means no judgements at all about spatio-temporal existence [Husserl] |
| 22210 | After everything is bracketed, consciousness still has a unique being of its own [Husserl] |
| 22215 | Phenomenology describes consciousness, in the light of pure experiences [Husserl] |
| 22201 | The use of mathematical-style definitions in philosophy is fruitless and harmful [Husserl] |
| 10482 | The logic of ZF is classical first-order predicate logic with identity [Boolos] |
| 10492 | A few axioms of set theory 'force themselves on us', but most of them don't [Boolos] |
| 18192 | Do the Replacement Axioms exceed the iterative conception of sets? [Boolos, by Maddy] |
| 7785 | The use of plurals doesn't commit us to sets; there do not exist individuals and collections [Boolos] |
| 10485 | Naïve sets are inconsistent: there is no set for things that do not belong to themselves [Boolos] |
| 10484 | The iterative conception says sets are formed at stages; some are 'earlier', and must be formed first [Boolos] |
| 13547 | Limitation of Size is weak (Fs only collect is something the same size does) or strong (fewer Fs than objects) [Boolos, by Potter] |
| 10699 | Does a bowl of Cheerios contain all its sets and subsets? [Boolos] |
| 14249 | Boolos reinterprets second-order logic as plural logic [Boolos, by Oliver/Smiley] |
| 10225 | Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
| 10830 | Second-order logic metatheory is set-theoretic, and second-order validity has set-theoretic problems [Boolos] |
| 10736 | Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo] |
| 10780 | Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo] |
| 21222 | Logicians presuppose a world, and ignore logic/world connections, so their logic is impure [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
| 21223 | Phenomenology grounds logic in subjective experience [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
| 10829 | A sentence can't be a truth of logic if it asserts the existence of certain sets [Boolos] |
| 10697 | Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos] |
| 10832 | '∀x x=x' only means 'everything is identical to itself' if the range of 'everything' is fixed [Boolos] |
| 13671 | Second-order quantifiers are just like plural quantifiers in ordinary language, with no extra ontology [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
| 10267 | We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
| 10698 | Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos] |
| 7806 | Boolos invented plural quantification [Boolos, by Benardete,JA] |
| 10834 | Weak completeness: if it is valid, it is provable. Strong: it is provable from a set of sentences [Boolos] |
| 13841 | Why should compactness be definitive of logic? [Boolos, by Hacking] |
| 9837 | 0 is not a number, as it answers 'how many?' negatively [Husserl, by Dummett] |
| 9576 | Multiplicity in general is just one and one and one, etc. [Husserl] |
| 17444 | Husserl said counting is more basic than Frege's one-one correspondence [Husserl, by Heck] |
| 10491 | Infinite natural numbers is as obvious as infinite sentences in English [Boolos] |
| 10483 | Mathematics and science do not require very high orders of infinity [Boolos] |
| 21224 | Pure mathematics is the relations between all possible objects, and is thus formal ontology [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
| 10833 | Many concepts can only be expressed by second-order logic [Boolos] |
| 10490 | Mathematics isn't surprising, given that we experience many objects as abstract [Boolos] |
| 22209 | Our goal is to reveal a new hidden region of Being [Husserl] |
| 22211 | As a thing and its perception are separated, two modes of Being emerge [Husserl] |
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 21226 | Husserl sees the ego as a monad, unifying presence, sense and intentional acts [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
| 22202 | The World is all experiencable objects [Husserl] |
| 22213 | Absolute reality is an absurdity [Husserl] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 10700 | First- and second-order quantifiers are two ways of referring to the same things [Boolos] |
| 10488 | It is lunacy to think we only see ink-marks, and not word-types [Boolos] |
| 10487 | I am a fan of abstract objects, and confident of their existence [Boolos] |
| 10489 | We deal with abstract objects all the time: software, poems, mistakes, triangles.. [Boolos] |
| 21218 | The sense of anything contingent has a purely apprehensible essence or Eidos [Husserl] |
| 19263 | Imagine an object's properties varying; the ones that won't vary are the essential ones [Husserl, by Vaidya] |
| 21220 | The physical given, unlike the mental given, could be non-existing [Husserl] |
| 21216 | Husserl says we have intellectual intuitions (of categories), as well as of the senses [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
| 22205 | Feelings of self-evidence (and necessity) are just the inventions of theory [Husserl] |
| 21221 | Direct 'seeing' by consciousness is the ultimate rational legitimation [Husserl] |
| 22220 | The phenomena of memory are given in the present, but as being past [Husserl, by Bernet] |
| 22206 | Natural science has become great by just ignoring ancient scepticism [Husserl] |
| 22221 | We know another's mind via bodily expression, while also knowing it is inaccessible [Husserl, by Bernet] |
| 21228 | Husserl's monads (egos) communicate, through acts of empathy. [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
| 22212 | Pure consciousness is a sealed off system of actual Being [Husserl] |
| 9575 | Husserl identifies a positive mental act of unification, and a negative mental act for differences [Husserl, by Frege] |
| 21225 | The psychological ego is worldly, and the pure ego follows transcendental reduction [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
| 22214 | We never meet the Ego, as part of experience, or as left over from experience [Husserl] |
| 21214 | We clarify concepts (e.g. numbers) by determining their psychological origin [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
| 8693 | An 'abstraction principle' says two things are identical if they are 'equivalent' in some respect [Boolos] |
| 9819 | Psychologism blunders in focusing on concept-formation instead of delineating the concepts [Dummett on Husserl] |
| 9851 | Husserl wanted to keep a shadowy remnant of abstracted objects, to correlate them [Dummett on Husserl] |
| 22203 | Only facts follow from facts [Husserl] |