Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, H. Paul Grice and Thomas M. Crisp

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
The greatest philosophers are methodical; it is what makes them great [Grice]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
The weaker version of Truthmaker: 'truth supervenes on being' [Crisp,TM]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
The Truthmaker thesis spells trouble for presentists [Crisp,TM]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Truthmaker has problems with generalisation, non-existence claims, and property instantiations [Crisp,TM]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
Worm Perdurantism has a fusion of all the parts; Stage Perdurantism has one part at a time [Crisp,TM]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Conditionals are truth-functional, but we must take care with misleading ones [Grice, by Edgington]
The odd truth table for material conditionals is explained by conversational conventions [Grice, by Fisher]
Conditionals might remain truth-functional, despite inappropriate conversational remarks [Edgington on Grice]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
Conditionals are truth-functional, but unassertable in tricky cases? [Grice, by Read]
A person can be justified in believing a proposition, though it is unreasonable to actually say it [Grice, by Edgington]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
Meaning needs an intention to induce a belief, and a recognition that this is the speaker's intention [Grice]
Only the utterer's primary intention is relevant to the meaning [Grice]
We judge linguistic intentions rather as we judge non-linguistic intentions, so they are alike [Grice]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
Grice said patterns of use are often semantically irrelevant, because it is a pragmatic matter [Grice, by Glock]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
Grice's maxim of quality says do not assert what you believe to be false [Grice, by Magidor]
Grice's maxim of manner requires one to be as brief as possible [Grice, by Magidor]
Key conversational maxims are 'quality' (assert truth) and 'quantity' (leave nothing out) [Grice, by Read]
Grice's maxim of quantity says be sufficiently informative [Grice, by Magidor]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
'Eternalism' is the thesis that reality includes past, present and future entities [Crisp,TM]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
Presentists can talk of 'times', with no more commitment than modalists have to possible worlds [Crisp,TM]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
The only three theories are Presentism, Dynamic (A-series) Eternalism and Static (B-series) Eternalism [Crisp,TM]