Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. and Philolaus

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22 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
19125 If we define truth, we can eliminate it [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
19128 If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
19120 Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
19127 The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
19124 A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness [Halbach/Leigh]
19126 If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 2. FS Truth Axioms
19129 The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 3. KF Truth Axioms
19130 KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts [Halbach/Leigh]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
16062 A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16061 If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
16060 Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
16064 The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
19121 We can reduce properties to true formulas [Halbach/Leigh]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
19122 Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories [Halbach/Leigh]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
472 No things would be clear to us as entity or relationships unless there existed Number and its essence [Philolaus]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
22511 Some reasonings are stronger than we are [Philolaus]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 4. Mathematical Nature
1518 Everything must involve numbers, or it couldn't be thought about or known [Philolaus]
1519 Harmony must pre-exist the cosmos, to bring the dissimilar sources together [Philolaus]
473 There is no falsehood in harmony and number, only in irrational things [Philolaus]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / d. The unlimited
469 Existing things, and hence the Cosmos, are a mixture of the Limited and the Unlimited [Philolaus]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 6. Laws as Numerical
476 Self-created numbers make the universe stable [Philolaus]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
1787 Philolaus was the first person to say the earth moves in a circle [Philolaus, by Diog. Laertius]