Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Harold Noonan and Michael D. Resnik

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21 ideas

4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
6299 Axioms are often affirmed simply because they produce results which have been accepted [Resnik]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
6304 Mathematical realism says that maths exists, is largely true, and is independent of proofs [Resnik]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
16014 It is controversial whether only 'numerical identity' allows two things to be counted as one [Noonan]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
6300 Mathematical constants and quantifiers only exist as locations within structures or patterns [Resnik]
6303 Sets are positions in patterns [Resnik]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / d. Platonist structuralism
6302 Structuralism must explain why a triangle is a whole, and not a random set of points [Resnik]
6295 There are too many mathematical objects for them all to be mental or physical [Resnik]
6296 Maths is pattern recognition and representation, and its truth and proofs are based on these [Resnik]
6301 Congruence is the strongest relationship of patterns, equivalence comes next, and mutual occurrence is the weakest [Resnik]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
16062 A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16061 If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
16060 Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
16064 The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
16024 I could have died at five, but the summation of my adult stages could not [Noonan]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
16023 Stage theorists accept four-dimensionalism, but call each stage a whole object [Noonan]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
16015 Problems about identity can't even be formulated without the concept of identity [Noonan]
16017 Identity is usually defined as the equivalence relation satisfying Leibniz's Law [Noonan]
16016 Identity definitions (such as self-identity, or the smallest equivalence relation) are usually circular [Noonan]
16020 Identity can only be characterised in a second-order language [Noonan]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
16018 Indiscernibility is basic to our understanding of identity and distinctness [Noonan]
16019 Leibniz's Law must be kept separate from the substitutivity principle [Noonan]