23 ideas
18767 | Free logics has terms that do not designate real things, and even empty domains [Anderson,CA] |
12797 | If plural variables have 'some values', then non-count variables have 'some value' [Laycock] |
18763 | Basic variables in second-order logic are taken to range over subsets of the individuals [Anderson,CA] |
12794 | Plurals are semantical but not ontological [Laycock] |
18771 | Stop calling ∃ the 'existential' quantifier, read it as 'there is...', and range over all entities [Anderson,CA] |
17694 | Some non-count nouns can be used for counting, as in 'several wines' or 'fewer cheeses' [Laycock] |
17695 | Some apparent non-count words can take plural forms, such as 'snows' or 'waters' [Laycock] |
18769 | Do mathematicians use 'existence' differently when they say some entity exists? [Anderson,CA] |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
12792 | The category of stuff does not suit reference [Laycock] |
12799 | Descriptions of stuff are neither singular aggregates nor plural collections [Laycock] |
12818 | We shouldn't think some water retains its identity when it is mixed with air [Laycock] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
18770 | We can distinguish 'ontological' from 'existential' commitment, for different kinds of being [Anderson,CA] |
18766 | 's is non-existent' cannot be said if 's' does not designate [Anderson,CA] |
18768 | We cannot pick out a thing and deny its existence, but we can say a concept doesn't correspond [Anderson,CA] |
18765 | Individuation was a problem for medievals, then Leibniz, then Frege, then Wittgenstein (somewhat) [Anderson,CA] |
12795 | Parts must be of the same very general type as the wholes [Laycock] |
18764 | The notion of 'property' is unclear for a logical version of the Identity of Indiscernibles [Anderson,CA] |
17696 | 'Humility is a virtue' has an abstract noun, but 'water is a liquid' has a generic concrete noun [Laycock] |
12791 | It is said that proper reference is our intellectual link with the world [Laycock] |