Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Hugo Grotius and James O. Young

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22 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
19079 For idealists reality is like a collection of beliefs, so truths and truthmakers are not distinct [Young,JO]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
19076 Coherence theories differ over the coherence relation, and over the set of proposition with which to cohere [Young,JO]
19077 Two propositions could be consistent with your set, but inconsistent with one another [Young,JO]
19078 Coherence with actual beliefs, or our best beliefs, or ultimate ideal beliefs? [Young,JO]
19084 Coherent truth is not with an arbitrary set of beliefs, but with a set which people actually do believe [Young,JO]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
19083 How do you identify the best coherence set; and aren't there truths which don't cohere? [Young,JO]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
19075 Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions [Young,JO]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
16062 A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16061 If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
16060 Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
16064 The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
19074 Are truth-condtions other propositions (coherence) or features of the world (correspondence)? [Young,JO]
19082 Coherence truth suggests truth-condtions are assertion-conditions, which need knowledge of justification [Young,JO]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
7404 Nations are not obliged to help one-another, but are obliged not to harm one another [Grotius, by Tuck]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
7402 Everyone has a right of self-preservation, and harming others is usually unjustifiable [Grotius, by Tuck]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
21938 Democracy needs respect for individuality, but the 'community of friends' implies strict equality [Grotius]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 7. Freedom to leave
19845 A person is free to renounce their state, as long as it is not a moment of crisis [Grotius, by Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
22133 Grotius and Pufendorf based natural law on real (rather than idealised) humanity [Grotius, by Ford,JD]
7406 A natural right of self-preservation is balanced by a natural law to avoid unnecessary harm [Grotius, by Tuck]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / d. Legal positivism
7403 Grotius ignored elaborate natural law theories, preferring a basic right of self-preservation [Grotius, by Tuck]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / b. Justice in war
23585 It is permissible in a just cause to capture a place in neutral territory [Grotius]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
6892 Moral principles have some validity without a God commanding obedience [Grotius, by Mautner]