51 ideas
4643 | The Principle of Sufficient Reason does not presuppose that all explanations will be causal explanations [Baggini /Fosl] |
4633 | You cannot rationally deny the principle of non-contradiction, because all reasoning requires it [Baggini /Fosl] |
4635 | Dialectic aims at unified truth, unlike analysis, which divides into parts [Baggini /Fosl] |
15716 | If axioms and their implications have no contradictions, they pass my criterion of truth and existence [Hilbert] |
4632 | 'Natural' systems of deduction are based on normal rational practice, rather than on axioms [Baggini /Fosl] |
4631 | In ideal circumstances, an axiom should be such that no rational agent could possibly object to its use [Baggini /Fosl] |
4638 | The principle of bivalence distorts reality, as when claiming that a person is or is not 'thin' [Baggini /Fosl] |
18844 | You would cripple mathematics if you denied Excluded Middle [Hilbert] |
17963 | The facts of geometry, arithmetic or statics order themselves into theories [Hilbert] |
17966 | Axioms must reveal their dependence (or not), and must be consistent [Hilbert] |
8717 | Hilbert wanted to prove the consistency of all of mathematics (which realists take for granted) [Hilbert, by Friend] |
12456 | I aim to establish certainty for mathematical methods [Hilbert] |
12461 | We believe all mathematical problems are solvable [Hilbert] |
13472 | Hilbert aimed to eliminate number from geometry [Hilbert, by Hart,WD] |
9633 | No one shall drive us out of the paradise the Cantor has created for us [Hilbert] |
12460 | We extend finite statements with ideal ones, in order to preserve our logic [Hilbert] |
12462 | Only the finite can bring certainty to the infinite [Hilbert] |
12455 | The idea of an infinite totality is an illusion [Hilbert] |
12457 | There is no continuum in reality to realise the infinitely small [Hilbert] |
17967 | To decide some questions, we must study the essence of mathematical proof itself [Hilbert] |
9546 | Euclid axioms concerns possibilities of construction, but Hilbert's assert the existence of objects [Hilbert, by Chihara] |
18742 | Hilbert's formalisation revealed implicit congruence axioms in Euclid [Hilbert, by Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18217 | Hilbert's geometry is interesting because it captures Euclid without using real numbers [Hilbert, by Field,H] |
17965 | The whole of Euclidean geometry derives from a basic equation and transformations [Hilbert] |
17964 | Number theory just needs calculation laws and rules for integers [Hilbert] |
17697 | The existence of an arbitrarily large number refutes the idea that numbers come from experience [Hilbert] |
17698 | Logic already contains some arithmetic, so the two must be developed together [Hilbert] |
10113 | The grounding of mathematics is 'in the beginning was the sign' [Hilbert] |
10115 | Hilbert substituted a syntactic for a semantic account of consistency [Hilbert, by George/Velleman] |
22293 | Hilbert said (to block paradoxes) that mathematical existence is entailed by consistency [Hilbert, by Potter] |
12459 | The subject matter of mathematics is immediate and clear concrete symbols [Hilbert] |
10116 | Hilbert aimed to prove the consistency of mathematics finitely, to show infinities won't produce contradictions [Hilbert, by George/Velleman] |
18112 | Mathematics divides in two: meaningful finitary statements, and empty idealised statements [Hilbert] |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
4640 | If identity is based on 'true of X' instead of 'property of X' we get the Masked Man fallacy ('I know X but not Y') [Baggini /Fosl, by PG] |
4647 | 'I have the same car as you' is fine; 'I have the same fiancée as you' is not so good [Baggini /Fosl] |
4639 | Leibniz's Law is about the properties of objects; the Identity of Indiscernibles is about perception of objects [Baggini /Fosl] |
4646 | Is 'events have causes' analytic a priori, synthetic a posteriori, or synthetic a priori? [Baggini /Fosl] |
9636 | My theory aims at the certitude of mathematical methods [Hilbert] |
4645 | 'A priori' does not concern how you learn a proposition, but how you show whether it is true or false [Baggini /Fosl] |
4582 | Basic beliefs are self-evident, or sensual, or intuitive, or revealed, or guaranteed [Baggini /Fosl] |
4644 | A proposition such as 'some swans are purple' cannot be falsified, only verified [Baggini /Fosl] |
4584 | The problem of induction is how to justify our belief in the uniformity of nature [Baggini /Fosl] |
4583 | How can an argument be good induction, but poor deduction? [Baggini /Fosl] |
4634 | Abduction aims at simplicity, testability, coherence and comprehensiveness [Baggini /Fosl] |
4637 | To see if an explanation is the best, it is necessary to investigate the alternative explanations [Baggini /Fosl] |
4629 | Consistency is the cornerstone of rationality [Baggini /Fosl] |
17968 | By digging deeper into the axioms we approach the essence of sciences, and unity of knowedge [Hilbert] |