Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, J Baggini / PS Fosl and Jean Baudrillard

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38 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
There is no longer anything on which there is nothing to say [Baudrillard]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
Some continental philosophers are relativists - Baudrillard, for example [Baudrillard, by Critchley]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
The task of philosophy is to unmask the illusion of objective reality [Baudrillard]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Drunken boat pilots are less likely to collide than clearly focused ones [Baudrillard]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
The Principle of Sufficient Reason does not presuppose that all explanations will be causal explanations [Baggini /Fosl]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
You cannot rationally deny the principle of non-contradiction, because all reasoning requires it [Baggini /Fosl]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Dialectic aims at unified truth, unlike analysis, which divides into parts [Baggini /Fosl]
Instead of thesis and antithesis leading to synthesis, they now cancel out, and the conflict is levelled [Baudrillard]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
'Natural' systems of deduction are based on normal rational practice, rather than on axioms [Baggini /Fosl]
In ideal circumstances, an axiom should be such that no rational agent could possibly object to its use [Baggini /Fosl]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
The principle of bivalence distorts reality, as when claiming that a person is or is not 'thin' [Baggini /Fosl]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Without God we faced reality: what do we face without reality? [Baudrillard]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
Nothing is true, but everything is exact [Baudrillard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
If identity is based on 'true of X' instead of 'property of X' we get the Masked Man fallacy ('I know X but not Y') [Baggini /Fosl, by PG]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
'I have the same car as you' is fine; 'I have the same fiancée as you' is not so good [Baggini /Fosl]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
Leibniz's Law is about the properties of objects; the Identity of Indiscernibles is about perception of objects [Baggini /Fosl]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Is 'events have causes' analytic a priori, synthetic a posteriori, or synthetic a priori? [Baggini /Fosl]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
'A priori' does not concern how you learn a proposition, but how you show whether it is true or false [Baggini /Fosl]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
Basic beliefs are self-evident, or sensual, or intuitive, or revealed, or guaranteed [Baggini /Fosl]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
A proposition such as 'some swans are purple' cannot be falsified, only verified [Baggini /Fosl]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
The problem of induction is how to justify our belief in the uniformity of nature [Baggini /Fosl]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
How can an argument be good induction, but poor deduction? [Baggini /Fosl]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
Abduction aims at simplicity, testability, coherence and comprehensiveness [Baggini /Fosl]
To see if an explanation is the best, it is necessary to investigate the alternative explanations [Baggini /Fosl]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
There is no need to involve the idea of free will to make choices about one's life [Baudrillard]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Consistency is the cornerstone of rationality [Baggini /Fosl]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 6. Value of Art
In modern times, being useless is the essential aesthetic ingredient for an object [Baudrillard]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
Good versus evil has been banefully reduced to happiness versus misfortune [Baudrillard]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
Whole populations are terrorist threats to authorities, who unite against them [Baudrillard]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
People like democracy because it means they can avoid power [Baudrillard]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
Only in the last 200 years have people demanded the democratic privilege of being individuals [Baudrillard]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
The arrival of the news media brought history to an end [Baudrillard]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
Suicide is ascribed to depression, with the originality of the act of will ignored [Baudrillard]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / d. Pascal's Wager
Pascal says secular life is acceptable, but more fun with the hypothesis of God [Baudrillard]