11 ideas
21960 | Ordinary language is the beginning of philosophy, but there is much more to it [Austin,JL] |
10835 | True sentences says the appropriate descriptive thing on the appropriate demonstrative occasion [Austin,JL] |
10836 | Correspondence theorists shouldn't think that a country has just one accurate map [Austin,JL] |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
21598 | Austin revealed many meanings for 'vague': rough, ambiguous, general, incomplete... [Austin,JL, by Williamson] |
19727 | Reliabilist knowledge is evidence based belief, with high conditional probability [Comesaņa] |
19725 | In a sceptical scenario belief formation is unreliable, so no beliefs at all are justified? [Comesaņa] |
19726 | How do we decide which exact process is the one that needs to be reliable? [Comesaņa] |