12 ideas
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 3144 | Everything is what it is, and not another thing [Butler] |
| 21315 | A tree remains the same in the popular sense, but not in the strict philosophical sense [Butler] |
| 21317 | Despite consciousness fluctuating, we are aware that it belongs to one person [Butler] |
| 21313 | If consciousness of events makes our identity, then if we have forgotten them we didn't exist then [Butler] |
| 21314 | Consciousness presupposes personal identity, so it cannot constitute it [Butler] |
| 21318 | If the self changes, we have no responsibilities, and no interest in past or future [Butler] |
| 8066 | Butler exalts conscience, but it may be horribly misleading [Anscombe on Butler] |
| 7417 | God can't have silly perfections, but how do we decide which ones are 'silly'? [Joslin] |