14 ideas
8226 | A well-posed problem is a problem solved [Bergson, by Deleuze/Guattari] |
1403 | A rational donkey would starve to death between two totally identical piles of hay [Buridan, by PG] |
21846 | Bergson was a rallying point, because he emphasised becomings and multiplicities [Bergson, by Deleuze] |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16678 | Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan] |
16793 | A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan] |
16726 | Why can't we deduce secondary qualities from primary ones, if they cause them? [Buridan] |
21854 | Bergson showed that memory is not after the event, but coexists with it [Bergson, by Deleuze] |
16577 | Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan] |
16576 | Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan] |
22100 | Experienced time means no two mental moments are ever alike [Bergson] |