12 ideas
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
15312 | We get the idea of power by abstracting from ropes, magnets and electric shocks [Priestley] |
20877 | Errors in moral practice might be inconsistent or inappropriate principles, or inappropriate application [LaFollette] |
20878 | We can discuss the criteria of a judgment, or the weight given to them, or their application [LaFollette] |
20881 | The act/omission distinction is important for duties, but less so for consequences [LaFollette] |
20886 | Are we only obligated by agreement, or should we always help the weak? [LaFollette] |
20879 | Too many options may open us to unwanted pressures, like being paid very little [LaFollette] |
20880 | Should people be forced to make choices? [LaFollette] |
15311 | Attraction or repulsion are not imparted to matter, but actually constitute it [Priestley] |