Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Keith Devlin and Lawrence M. Krauss

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


26 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
Logic was merely a branch of rhetoric until the scientific 17th century [Devlin]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
'No councillors are bankers' and 'All bankers are athletes' implies 'Some athletes are not councillors' [Devlin]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
Modern propositional inference replaces Aristotle's 19 syllogisms with modus ponens [Devlin]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
Predicate logic retains the axioms of propositional logic [Devlin]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Situation theory is logic that takes account of context [Devlin]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
Golden ages: 1900-1960 for pure logic, and 1950-1985 for applied logic [Devlin]
Montague's intensional logic incorporated the notion of meaning [Devlin]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 7. Strict Implication
Where a conditional is purely formal, an implication implies a link between premise and conclusion [Devlin]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Sentences of apparent identical form can have different contextual meanings [Devlin]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / a. Achilles paradox
Space and time are atomic in the arrow, and divisible in the tortoise [Devlin]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
An understanding of the most basic physics should explain all of the subject's mysteries [Krauss]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
In 1676 it was discovered that water is teeming with life [Krauss]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 5. Language Relativism
People still say the Hopi have no time concepts, despite Whorf's later denial [Devlin]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
How do we parse 'time flies like an arrow' and 'fruit flies like an apple'? [Devlin]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
The distinction between sentences and abstract propositions is crucial in logic [Devlin]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / a. Special relativity
Space itself can expand (and separate its contents) at faster than light speeds [Krauss]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / b. General relativity
General Relativity: the density of energy and matter determines curvature and gravity [Krauss]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / d. Quantum mechanics
Uncertainty says that energy can be very high over very short time periods [Krauss]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / e. Protons
Most of the mass of a proton is the energy in virtual particles (rather than the quarks) [Krauss]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
Empty space contains a continual flux of brief virtual particles [Krauss]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 3. The Beginning
The universe is precisely 13.72 billion years old [Krauss]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 10. Multiverse
It seems likely that cosmic inflation is eternal, and this would make a multiverse inevitable [Krauss]