21 ideas
| 7760 | Russell only uses descriptions attributively, and Strawson only referentially [Donnellan, by Lycan] |
| 5811 | A definite description can have a non-referential use [Donnellan] |
| 5812 | Definite descriptions are 'attributive' if they say something about x, and 'referential' if they pick x out [Donnellan] |
| 5814 | 'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence [Donnellan] |
| 21110 | An understanding of the most basic physics should explain all of the subject's mysteries [Krauss] |
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 21105 | In 1676 it was discovered that water is teeming with life [Krauss] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 10435 | A definite description 'the F' is referential if the speaker could thereby be referring to something not-F [Donnellan, by Sainsbury] |
| 10451 | Donnellan is unclear whether the referential-attributive distinction is semantic or pragmatic [Bach on Donnellan] |
| 5813 | A description can successfully refer, even if its application to the subject is not believed [Donnellan] |
| 5815 | Whether a definite description is referential or attributive depends on the speaker's intention [Donnellan] |
| 21109 | Space itself can expand (and separate its contents) at faster than light speeds [Krauss] |
| 21104 | General Relativity: the density of energy and matter determines curvature and gravity [Krauss] |
| 21107 | Uncertainty says that energy can be very high over very short time periods [Krauss] |
| 21106 | Most of the mass of a proton is the energy in virtual particles (rather than the quarks) [Krauss] |
| 21112 | Empty space contains a continual flux of brief virtual particles [Krauss] |
| 21108 | The universe is precisely 13.72 billion years old [Krauss] |
| 21111 | It seems likely that cosmic inflation is eternal, and this would make a multiverse inevitable [Krauss] |