30 ideas
| 22358 | Scientific objectivity lies in inter-subjective testing [Popper] |
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 3523 | Shadows are supervenient on their objects, but not reducible [Maslin] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 3517 | 'Ontology' means 'study of things which exist' [Maslin] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 11946 | Propensities are part of a situation, not part of the objects [Popper] |
| 12177 | Human artefacts may have essences, in their purposes [Popper] |
| 5451 | Popper felt that ancient essentialism was a bar to progress [Popper, by Mautner] |
| 22188 | Give Nobel Prizes for really good refutations? [Gorham on Popper] |
| 18284 | Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper] |
| 7780 | Falsification is the criterion of demarcation between science and non-science [Popper, by Magee] |
| 16830 | We don't only reject hypotheses because we have falsified them [Lipton on Popper] |
| 6794 | If falsification requires logical inconsistency, then probabilistic statements can't be falsified [Bird on Popper] |
| 6795 | When Popper gets in difficulties, he quietly uses induction to help out [Bird on Popper] |
| 3856 | Good theories have empirical content, explain a lot, and are not falsified [Popper, by Newton-Smith] |
| 7779 | There is no such thing as induction [Popper, by Magee] |
| 3860 | Science cannot be shown to be rational if induction is rejected [Newton-Smith on Popper] |
| 12176 | Science does not aim at ultimate explanations [Popper] |
| 3538 | Analogy to other minds is uncheckable, over-confident and chauvinistic [Maslin] |
| 3540 | If we are brains then we never meet each other [Maslin] |
| 3518 | I'm not the final authority on my understanding of maths [Maslin] |
| 3530 | Denial of purely mental causation will lead to epiphenomenalism [Maslin] |
| 3520 | Token-identity removes the explanatory role of the physical [Maslin] |
| 3528 | Causality may require that a law is being followed [Maslin] |
| 3525 | Strict laws make causation logically necessary [Maslin] |
| 3527 | Strict laws allow no exceptions and are part of a closed system [Maslin] |
| 12175 | Galilean science aimed at true essences, as the ultimate explanations [Popper] |
| 12179 | Essentialist views of science prevent further questions from being raised [Popper] |