16 ideas
| 9355 | One sort of circularity presupposes a premise, the other presupposes a rule being used [Braithwaite, by Devitt] |
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 3523 | Shadows are supervenient on their objects, but not reducible [Maslin] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 3517 | 'Ontology' means 'study of things which exist' [Maslin] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 3538 | Analogy to other minds is uncheckable, over-confident and chauvinistic [Maslin] |
| 3540 | If we are brains then we never meet each other [Maslin] |
| 3518 | I'm not the final authority on my understanding of maths [Maslin] |
| 3530 | Denial of purely mental causation will lead to epiphenomenalism [Maslin] |
| 3520 | Token-identity removes the explanatory role of the physical [Maslin] |
| 3528 | Causality may require that a law is being followed [Maslin] |
| 3525 | Strict laws make causation logically necessary [Maslin] |
| 3527 | Strict laws allow no exceptions and are part of a closed system [Maslin] |
| 1468 | If meaning is use, then religious sentences have meaning because they are used to assert an intention about how to live [Braithwaite, by PG] |