Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Kent Bach and Ludwig Feuerbach

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


69 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
All philosophies presuppose their historical moment, and arise from it [Feuerbach]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy is distinguished from other sciences by its complete lack of presuppositions [Feuerbach]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
I don't study Plato for his own sake; the primary aim is always understanding [Feuerbach]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
Only that which can be an object of religion is an object of philosophy [Feuerbach]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Philosophy should not focus on names, but on the determined nature of things [Feuerbach]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
Modern philosophy begins with Descartes' abstraction from sensation and matter [Feuerbach]
Empiricism is right about ideas, but forgets man himself as one of our objects [Feuerbach]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
The laws of reality are also the laws of thought [Feuerbach]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Each proposition has an antithesis, and truth exists as its refutation [Feuerbach]
A dialectician has to be his own opponent [Feuerbach]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Truth forges an impersonal unity between people [Feuerbach]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
Free logic at least allows empty names, but struggles to express non-existence [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
In first-order we can't just assert existence, and it is very hard to deny something's existence [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 3. Constants in Logic
In logic constants play the role of proper names [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Proper names can be non-referential - even predicate as well as attributive uses [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
An object can be described without being referred to [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
Definite descriptions can be used to refer, but are not semantically referential [Bach]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Absolute thought remains in another world from being [Feuerbach]
Being is what is undetermined, and hence indistinguishable [Feuerbach]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Being posits essence, and my essence is my being [Feuerbach]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
Particularity belongs to being, whereas generality belongs to thought [Feuerbach]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
The only true being is of the senses, perception, feeling and love [Feuerbach]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
To our consciousness it is language which looks unreal [Feuerbach]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Consciousness is absolute reality, and everything exists through consciousness [Feuerbach]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
The Absolute is the 'and' which unites 'spirit and nature' [Feuerbach]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
Ideas arise through communication, and reason is reached through community [Feuerbach]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
In man the lowest senses of smell and taste elevate themselves to intellectual acts [Feuerbach]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
How could 'S knows he has hands' not have a fixed content? [Bach]
If contextualism is right, knowledge sentences are baffling out of their context [Bach]
Sceptics aren't changing the meaning of 'know', but claiming knowing is tougher than we think [Bach]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
When absorbed in deep reflection, is your reason in control, or is it you? [Feuerbach]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
The new philosophy thinks of the concrete in a concrete (not a abstract) manner [Feuerbach]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Fictional reference is different inside and outside the fiction [Bach]
We can refer to fictional entities if they are abstract objects [Bach]
You 'allude to', not 'refer to', an individual if you keep their identity vague [Bach]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
What refers: indefinite or definite or demonstrative descriptions, names, indexicals, demonstratives? [Bach]
If we can refer to things which change, we can't be obliged to single out their properties [Bach]
We can think of an individual without have a uniquely characterizing description [Bach]
It can't be real reference if it could refer to some other thing that satisfies the description [Bach]
Since most expressions can be used non-referentially, none of them are inherently referential [Bach]
Just alluding to or describing an object is not the same as referring to it [Bach]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
Context does not create reference; it is just something speakers can exploit [Bach]
'That duck' may not refer to the most obvious one in the group [Bach]
What a pronoun like 'he' refers back to is usually a matter of speaker's intentions [Bach]
Information comes from knowing who is speaking, not just from interpretation of the utterance [Bach]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
People slide from contextual variability all the way to contextual determination [Bach]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
Plotinus was ashamed to have a body [Feuerbach]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
If you love nothing, it doesn't matter whether something exists or not [Feuerbach]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Reason, love and will are the highest perfections and essence of man - the purpose of his life [Feuerbach]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / i. Absolute virtues
Egoism is the only evil, love the only good; genuine love produces all the other virtues [Feuerbach]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Man is not a particular being, like animals, but a universal being [Feuerbach]
The essence of man is in community, but with distinct individuals [Feuerbach]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
Consciousness is said to distinguish man from animals - consciousness of his own species [Feuerbach]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
A God needs justice, kindness and wisdom, but those concepts don't depend on the concept of God [Feuerbach]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
God's existence cannot be separated from essence and concept, which can only be thought as existing [Feuerbach]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
The nature of God is an expression of human nature [Feuerbach]
If God is only an object for man, then only the essence of man is revealed in God [Feuerbach]
God is what man would like to be [Feuerbach]
God is for us a mere empty idea, which we fill with our own ego and essence [Feuerbach]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
If love, goodness and personality are human, the God who is their source is anthropomorphic [Feuerbach]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Catholicism concerns God in himself, Protestantism what God is for man [Feuerbach]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Religion is the consciousness of the infinite [Feuerbach]
Absolute idealism is the realized divine mind of Leibnizian theism [Feuerbach]
Today's atheism will tomorrow become a religion [Feuerbach]