38 ideas
9307 | Modern Western culture suddenly appeared in Jena in the 1790s [Svendsen] |
9297 | You can't understand love in terms of 'if and only if...' [Svendsen] |
10405 | In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy [Swoyer] |
10407 | Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences [Swoyer] |
14592 | Some abstract things have a beginning and end, so may exist in time (though not space) [Swoyer] |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
10421 | Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic [Swoyer] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
14594 | Ontologists seek existence and identity conditions, and modal and epistemic status for a thing [Swoyer] |
10410 | Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance [Swoyer] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
10399 | If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal [Swoyer] |
10416 | Can properties have parts? [Swoyer] |
14595 | Can properties exemplify other properties? [Swoyer] |
10417 | There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured') [Swoyer] |
10413 | The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer] |
10402 | Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places [Swoyer] |
10400 | Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties [Swoyer] |
10403 | If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract [Swoyer] |
14593 | Quantum field theory suggests that there are, fundamentally, no individual things [Swoyer] |
10406 | One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties [Swoyer] |
9308 | If subjective and objective begin to merge, then so do primary and secondary qualities [Svendsen] |
10404 | Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything [Swoyer] |
9309 | Emotions have intentional objects, while a mood is objectless [Svendsen] |
10408 | Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression [Swoyer] |
10409 | Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples [Swoyer] |
10401 | The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations [Swoyer] |
10420 | Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled [Swoyer] |
9304 | Death appears to be more frightening the less one has lived [Svendsen] |
9298 | We can be unaware that we are bored [Svendsen] |
9301 | Boredom is so radical that suicide could not overcome it; only never having existed would do it [Svendsen] |
9302 | We are bored because everything comes to us fully encoded, and we want personal meaning [Svendsen] |
9310 | The profoundest boredom is boredom with boredom [Svendsen] |
9311 | We have achieved a sort of utopia, and it is boring, so that is the end of utopias [Svendsen] |
9303 | The concept of 'alienation' seems no longer applicable [Svendsen] |
10412 | If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction [Swoyer] |
10411 | Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers [Swoyer] |