37 ideas
12452 | Our dislike of contradiction in logic is a matter of psychology, not mathematics [Brouwer] |
15941 | For intuitionists excluded middle is an outdated historical convention [Brouwer] |
18119 | Mathematics is a mental activity which does not use language [Brouwer, by Bostock] |
18247 | Brouwer saw reals as potential, not actual, and produced by a rule, or a choice [Brouwer, by Shapiro] |
12451 | Scientific laws largely rest on the results of counting and measuring [Brouwer] |
18118 | Brouwer regards the application of mathematics to the world as somehow 'wicked' [Brouwer, by Bostock] |
12454 | Intuitionists only accept denumerable sets [Brouwer] |
12453 | Neo-intuitionism abstracts from the reuniting of moments, to intuit bare two-oneness [Brouwer] |
8728 | Intuitionist mathematics deduces by introspective construction, and rejects unknown truths [Brouwer] |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
9240 | Love creates a necessity concerning what to care about [Frankfurt] |
9264 | Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
9266 | A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
9267 | Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt] |
10117 | Intuitonists in mathematics worried about unjustified assertion, as well as contradiction [Brouwer, by George/Velleman] |
9265 | The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt] |
20015 | Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall] |
9228 | Ranking order of desires reveals nothing, because none of them may be considered important [Frankfurt] |
9270 | A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt] |
9269 | A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt] |
9238 | Morality isn't based on reason; moral indignation is quite unlike disapproval of irrationality [Frankfurt] |
9232 | It is by caring about things that we infuse the world with importance [Frankfurt] |
9234 | If you don't care about at least one thing, you can't find reasons to care about anything [Frankfurt] |
9229 | What is worthwhile for its own sake alone may be worth very little [Frankfurt] |
9233 | Our criteria for evaluating how to live offer an answer to the problem [Frankfurt] |
9235 | Rather than loving things because we value them, I think we value things because we love them [Frankfurt] |
9236 | Love can be cool, and it may not involve liking its object [Frankfurt] |
9237 | The paradigm case of pure love is not romantic, but that between parents and infants [Frankfurt] |
9239 | I value my children for their sake, but I also value my love for them for its own sake [Frankfurt] |
9227 | We might not choose a very moral life, if the character or constitution was deficient [Frankfurt] |
9230 | People want to fulfill their desires, but also for their desires to be sustained [Frankfurt] |
9241 | Loving oneself is not a failing, but is essential to a successful life [Frankfurt] |
9300 | Boredom is serious, not just uncomfortable; it threatens our psychic survival [Frankfurt] |
9231 | Freedom needs autonomy (rather than causal independence) - embracing our own desires and choices [Frankfurt] |