54 ideas
21852 | Nomads are the basis of history, and yet almost unknowable [Deleuze] |
21844 | The history of philosophy is an agent of power: how can you think if you haven't read the great names? [Deleuze] |
21849 | Thought should be thrown like a stone from a war-machine [Deleuze] |
21845 | Philosophy aims to become the official language, supporting orthodoxy and the state [Deleuze] |
21839 | When I meet objections I just move on; they never contribute anything [Deleuze] |
21901 | 'Difference' refers to that which eludes capture [Deleuze, by May] |
21841 | We must create new words, and treat them as normal, and as if designating real things. [Deleuze] |
21842 | Don't assess ideas for truth or justice; look for another idea, and establish a relationship with it [Deleuze] |
21850 | Dualisms can be undone from within, by tracing connections, and drawing them to a new path [Deleuze] |
10354 | Correspondence could be with other beliefs, rather than external facts [Kusch] |
10353 | Tarskians distinguish truth from falsehood by relations between members of sets [Kusch] |
21838 | Before we seek solutions, it is important to invent problems [Deleuze] |
21902 | 'Being' is univocal, but its subject matter is actually 'difference' [Deleuze] |
21908 | Ontology can be continual creation, not to know being, but to probe the unknowable [Deleuze] |
21899 | There is no being beyond becoming [Deleuze] |
21847 | Before Being there is politics [Deleuze] |
21903 | Ontology does not tell what there is; it is just a strange adventure [Deleuze, by May] |
21904 | Being is a problem to be engaged, not solved, and needs a new mode of thinking [Deleuze, by May] |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
21907 | We don't want another new set of categories; we want a variety of flexible categories [Deleuze, by May] |
10337 | We can have knowledge without belief, if others credit us with knowledge [Kusch] |
10357 | Methodological Solipsism assumes all ideas could be derived from one mind [Kusch] |
10339 | Foundations seem utterly private, even from oneself at a later time [Kusch] |
10331 | Testimony is reliable if it coheres with evidence for a belief, and with other beliefs [Kusch] |
10338 | The coherentist restricts the space of reasons to the realm of beliefs [Kusch] |
10340 | Individualistic coherentism lacks access to all of my beliefs, or critical judgement of my assessment [Kusch] |
10345 | Individual coherentism cannot generate the necessary normativity [Kusch] |
10350 | Cultures decide causal routes, and they can be critically assessed [Kusch] |
10343 | Process reliabilism has been called 'virtue epistemology', resting on perception, memory, reason [Kusch] |
10341 | Justification depends on the audience and one's social role [Kusch] |
10334 | Testimony is an area in which epistemology meets ethics [Kusch] |
10336 | Powerless people are assumed to be unreliable, even about their own lives [Kusch] |
10324 | Testimony does not just transmit knowledge between individuals - it actually generates knowledge [Kusch] |
10327 | Some want to reduce testimony to foundations of perceptions, memories and inferences [Kusch] |
10329 | Testimony won't reduce to perception, if perception depends on social concepts and categories [Kusch] |
10330 | A foundation is what is intelligible, hence from a rational source, and tending towards truth [Kusch] |
10325 | Vindicating testimony is an expression of individualism [Kusch] |
10335 | Myths about lonely genius are based on epistemological individualism [Kusch] |
10323 | Communitarian Epistemology says 'knowledge' is a social status granted to groups of people [Kusch] |
10348 | Private justification is justification to imagined other people [Kusch] |
21840 | A meeting of man and animal can be deterritorialization (like a wasp with an orchid) [Deleuze] |
21843 | People consist of many undetermined lines, some rigid, some supple, some 'lines of flight' [Deleuze] |
10349 | To be considered 'an individual' is performed by a society [Kusch] |
10344 | Our experience may be conceptual, but surely not the world itself? [Kusch] |
10358 | Often socialising people is the only way to persuade them [Kusch] |
10333 | Communitarianism in epistemology sees the community as the primary knower [Kusch] |
21853 | We are currently extending capitalism to the whole of society [Deleuze] |
21848 | Some lines (of flight) are becomings which escape the system [Deleuze] |
21851 | The State requires self-preservation, but the war-machine desires destruction [Deleuze] |
10351 | Natural kinds are social institutions [Kusch] |
10332 | Omniscience is incoherent, since knowledge is a social concept [Kusch] |