9 ideas
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
12354 | A 'categorial' property is had by virtue of being or having an item from a category [Wedin] |
12358 | Substance is a principle and a kind of cause [Wedin] |
12346 | Form explains why some matter is of a certain kind, and that is explanatory bedrock [Wedin] |
23216 | The brain is not passive, and merely processing inputs; it is active, and intervenes in the world [Cobb] |
23226 | There is a single mouse neuron which has 862 inputs and 626 outputs [Cobb] |