15 ideas
15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
19525 | If the only aim is to believe truths, that justifies recklessly believing what is unsupported (if it is right) [Conee/Feldman] |
19524 | We don't have the capacity to know all the logical consequences of our beliefs [Conee/Feldman] |
19518 | Evidentialism says justifications supervene on the available evidence [Conee/Feldman] |
19519 | Rational decisions are either taken to be based on evidence, or to be explained causally [Conee/Feldman] |