29 ideas
| 10751 | Second-order logic needs the sets, and its consequence has epistemological problems [Rossberg] |
| 10757 | Henkin semantics has a second domain of predicates and relations (in upper case) [Rossberg] |
| 10759 | There are at least seven possible systems of semantics for second-order logic [Rossberg] |
| 10753 | Logical consequence is intuitively semantic, and captured by model theory [Rossberg] |
| 10752 | Γ |- S says S can be deduced from Γ; Γ |= S says a good model for Γ makes S true [Rossberg] |
| 10754 | In proof-theory, logical form is shown by the logical constants [Rossberg] |
| 10756 | A model is a domain, and an interpretation assigning objects, predicates, relations etc. [Rossberg] |
| 10758 | If models of a mathematical theory are all isomorphic, it is 'categorical', with essentially one model [Rossberg] |
| 10761 | Completeness can always be achieved by cunning model-design [Rossberg] |
| 10755 | A deductive system is only incomplete with respect to a formal semantics [Rossberg] |
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 8502 | Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt] |
| 8503 | The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt] |
| 8501 | Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have [Devitt] |
| 17368 | Essentialism concerns the nature of a group, not its category [Devitt] |
| 17370 | Things that gradually change, like species, can still have essences [Devitt] |
| 9354 | Why should necessities only be knowable a priori? That Hesperus is Phosporus is known empirically [Devitt] |
| 19565 | How could the mind have a link to the necessary character of reality? [Devitt] |
| 9353 | We explain away a priori knowledge, not as directly empirical, but as indirectly holistically empirical [Devitt] |
| 9356 | The idea of the a priori is so obscure that it won't explain anything [Devitt] |
| 19564 | Some knowledge must be empirical; naturalism implies that all knowledge is like that [Devitt] |
| 17371 | Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt] |
| 17369 | We name species as small to share properties, but large enough to yield generalisations [Devitt] |
| 17367 | Species are phenetic, biological, niche, or phylogenetic-cladistic [Devitt, by PG] |
| 17372 | The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt] |
| 17373 | Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt] |