7 ideas
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
19729 | 'Modal epistemology' demands a connection between the belief and facts in possible worlds [Black,T] |
19728 | Gettier and lottery cases seem to involve luck, meaning bad connection of beliefs to facts [Black,T] |
15314 | Faraday's single field of variable forces introduces a criterion of Unity into what is ultimate [Faraday, by Harré/Madden] |