Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Michael J. Loux and Robert Boyle

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23 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
15957 Essential definitions show the differences that discriminate things, and make them what they are [Boyle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
16062 A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16061 If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
16060 Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
16064 The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
4483 If abstract terms are sets of tropes, 'being a unicorn' and 'being a griffin' turn out identical [Loux]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
15965 Boyle attacked a contemporary belief that powers were occult things [Boyle, by Alexander,P]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
16735 In the 17th century, 'disposition' usually just means the spatial arrangement of parts [Boyle, by Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
4481 Austere nominalists insist that the realist's universals lack the requisite independent identifiability [Loux]
4477 Universals come in hierarchies of generality [Loux]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
4482 Austere nominalism has to take a host of things (like being red, or human) as primitive [Loux]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
4478 Nominalism needs to account for abstract singular terms like 'circularity'. [Loux]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
4480 Times and places are identified by objects, so cannot be used in a theory of object-identity [Loux]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
16034 Form is not a separate substance, but just the manner, modification or 'stamp' of matter [Boyle]
15953 To cite a substantial form tells us what produced the effect, but not how it did it [Boyle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
15962 Boyle's term 'texture' is not something you feel, but is unobservable structures of particles [Boyle, by Alexander,P]
15964 Boyle's secondary qualities are not illusory, or 'in the mind' [Boyle, by Alexander,P]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
16736 Explanation is generally to deduce it from something better known, which comes in degrees [Boyle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
15960 Explanation is deducing a phenomenon from some nature better known to us [Boyle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
16737 The best explanations get down to primary basics, but others go less deep [Boyle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
15952 The corpuscles just have shape, size and motion, which explains things without 'sympathies' or 'forces' [Boyle, by Alexander,P]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / b. Corpuscles
15972 The corpuscular theory allows motion, but does not include forces between the particles [Boyle, by Alexander,P]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
15961 I don't see how mere moving matter can lead to the bodies of men and animals, and especially their seeds [Boyle]