Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Mirabeau and committee and Jonathan Kvanvig

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22 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
16062 A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16061 If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
16060 Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
16064 The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
19566 Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
19261 Understanding is seeing coherent relationships in the relevant information [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
19568 Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
19567 The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19679 'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
19730 Epistemic virtues: love of knowledge, courage, caution, autonomy, practical wisdom... [Kvanvig]
19731 If epistemic virtues are faculties or powers, that doesn't explain propositional knowledge [Kvanvig]
19732 The value of good means of attaining truth are swamped by the value of the truth itself [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
19678 Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
19570 Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
19855 The purpose of society is to protect the rights of liberty, property, security and resistance [Mirabeau/committee]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
19856 The law expresses the general will, and all citizens can participate [Mirabeau/committee]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
19861 There is only a constitution if rights are assured, and separation of powers defined [Mirabeau/committee]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 2. Freedom of belief
19858 No one should be molested for their opinions, if they do not disturb the established order [Mirabeau/committee]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
19859 Free speech is very precious, and everyone may speak and write freely (but take responsibility for it) [Mirabeau/committee]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
19857 All citizens are eligible for roles in the state, purely on the basis of merit [Mirabeau/committee]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
19862 Property is a sacred right, breached only when essential, and with fair compensation [Mirabeau/committee]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 4. Taxation
19860 Everyone must contribute to the state's power and administration, in just proportion [Mirabeau/committee]