33 ideas
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
12132 | Indiscernibility is a necessary and sufficient condition for identity [Brody] |
15834 | Brody bases sortal essentialism on properties required throughout something's existence [Brody, by Mackie,P] |
12140 | Modern emphasis is on properties had essentially; traditional emphasis is on sort-defining properties [Brody] |
11895 | A sortal essence is a property which once possessed always possessed [Brody, by Mackie,P] |
12141 | Maybe essential properties are those which determine a natural kind? [Brody] |
12137 | De re essentialism standardly says all possible objects identical with a have a's essential properties [Brody] |
12142 | Essentially, a has P, always had P, must have had P, and has never had a future without P [Brody] |
12143 | An object having a property essentially is equivalent to its having it necessarily [Brody] |
12144 | Essentialism is justified if the essential properties of things explain their other properties [Brody] |
12139 | Mereological essentialism says that every part that ensures the existence is essential [Brody] |
12135 | Interrupted objects have two first moments of existence, which could be two beginnings [Brody] |
12130 | a and b share all properties; so they share being-identical-with-a; so a = b [Brody] |
12138 | Identity across possible worlds is prior to rigid designation [Brody] |
2584 | Lobotomised patients can cease to care about a pain [Block] |
6172 | The Inverted Earth example shows that phenomenal properties are not representational [Block, by Rowlands] |
2582 | A brain looks no more likely than anything else to cause qualia [Block] |
2574 | Behaviour requires knowledge as well as dispositions [Block] |
2576 | In functionalism, desires are internal states with causal relations [Block] |
2575 | Functionalism is behaviourism, but with mental states as intermediaries [Block] |
2583 | You might invert colours, but you can't invert beliefs [Block] |
2578 | Could a creature without a brain be in the right functional state for pain? [Block] |
2585 | Not just any old functional network will have mental states [Block] |
2586 | In functionalism, what are the special inputs and outputs of conscious creatures? [Block] |
2579 | Physicalism is prejudiced in favour of our neurology, when other systems might have minds [Block] |
2577 | Simple machine-functionalism says mind just is a Turing machine [Block] |
2580 | A Turing machine, given a state and input, specifies an output and the next state [Block] |
3178 | A fast machine could pass all behavioural tests with a vast lookup table [Block, by Rey] |
18033 | The meaning of a representation is its role in thought, perception or decisions [Block] |
2581 | Intuition may say that a complex sentence is ungrammatical, but linguistics can show that it is not [Block] |