Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Ofra Magidor and Graeme Forbes

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87 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
There must be a plausible epistemological theory alongside any metaphysical theory [Forbes,G]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
People have dreams which involve category mistakes [Magidor]
Category mistakes are either syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic [Magidor]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / b. Category mistake as syntactic
Category mistakes seem to be universal across languages [Magidor]
Category mistakes as syntactic needs a huge number of fine-grained rules [Magidor]
Embedded (in 'he said that…') category mistakes show syntax isn't the problem [Magidor]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / c. Category mistake as semantic
Category mistakes are meaningful, because metaphors are meaningful category mistakes [Magidor]
The normal compositional view makes category mistakes meaningful [Magidor]
If a category mistake is synonymous across two languages, that implies it is meaningful [Magidor]
If a category mistake has unimaginable truth-conditions, then it seems to be meaningless [Magidor]
Two good sentences should combine to make a good sentence, but that might be absurd [Magidor]
A good explanation of why category mistakes sound wrong is that they are meaningless [Magidor]
Category mistakes are neither verifiable nor analytic, so verificationism says they are meaningless [Magidor]
Category mistakes play no role in mental life, so conceptual role semantics makes them meaningless [Magidor]
Maybe when you say 'two is green', the predicate somehow fails to apply? [Magidor]
If category mistakes aren't syntax failure or meaningless, maybe they just lack a truth-value? [Magidor]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / d. Category mistake as pragmatic
Maybe the presuppositions of category mistakes are the abilities of things? [Magidor]
Category mistakes suffer from pragmatic presupposition failure (which is not mere triviality) [Magidor]
Category mistakes because of presuppositions still have a truth value (usually 'false') [Magidor]
In 'two is green', 'green' has a presupposition of being coloured [Magidor]
'Numbers are coloured and the number two is green' seems to be acceptable [Magidor]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / e. Category mistake as ontological
The presuppositions in category mistakes reveal nothing about ontology [Magidor]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / a. Symbols of PL
The symbol 'ι' forms definite descriptions; (ιx)F(x) says 'the x which is such that F(x)' [Forbes,G]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 8. Intensional Logic
Intensional logic maps logical space, showing which predicates are compatible or incompatible [Magidor]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
Is the meaning of 'and' given by its truth table, or by its introduction and elimination rules? [Forbes,G]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / e. Caesar problem
Some suggest that the Julius Caesar problem involves category mistakes [Magidor]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
Vagueness problems arise from applying sharp semantics to vague languages [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
In all instances of identity, there must be some facts to ensure the identity [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
We can explain the statue/clay problem by a category mistake with a false premise [Magidor]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
If we combined two clocks, it seems that two clocks may have become one clock. [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Only individual essences will ground identities across worlds in other properties [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P]
An individual essence is a set of essential properties which only that object can have [Forbes,G]
Non-trivial individual essence is properties other than de dicto, or universal, or relational [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Essential properties depend on a category, and perhaps also on particular facts [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
A property is essential iff the object would not exist if it lacked that property [Forbes,G]
Properties are trivially essential if they are not grounded in a thing's specific nature [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Essential properties are those without which an object could not exist [Forbes,G]
A relation is essential to two items if it holds in every world where they exist [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
Trivially essential properties are existence, self-identity, and de dicto necessities [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
A property is 'extraneously essential' if it is had only because of the properties of other objects [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
Same parts does not ensure same artefact, if those parts could constitute a different artefact [Forbes,G]
Artefacts have fuzzy essences [Forbes,G]
One might be essentialist about the original bronze from which a statue was made [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
An individual might change their sex in a world, but couldn't have differed in sex at origin [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Identities must hold because of other facts, which must be instrinsic [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
De re modal formulae, unlike de dicto, are sensitive to transworld identities [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
De re necessity is a form of conceptual necessity, just as de dicto necessity is [Forbes,G]
The source of de dicto necessity is not concepts, but the actual properties of the thing [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
Unlike places and times, we cannot separate possible worlds from what is true at them [Forbes,G]
The problem with possible worlds realism is epistemological; we can't know properties of possible objects [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds are points of logical space, rather like other times than our own [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Transworld identity concerns the limits of possibility for ordinary things [Forbes,G]
The problem of transworld identity can be solved by individual essences [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Counterpart theory is not good at handling the logic of identity [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
Haecceitism attributes to each individual a primitive identity or thisness [Forbes,G]
We believe in thisnesses, because we reject bizarre possibilities as not being about that individual [Forbes,G]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
Propositional attitudes relate agents to either propositions, or meanings, or sentence/utterances [Magidor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Two sentences with different meanings can, on occasion, have the same content [Magidor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
To grasp 'two' and 'green', must you know that two is not green? [Magidor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
Generative semantics says structure is determined by semantics as well as syntactic rules [Magidor]
'John is easy to please' and 'John is eager to please' have different deep structure [Magidor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
The semantics of a sentence is its potential for changing a context [Magidor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Weaker compositionality says meaningful well-formed sentences get the meaning from the parts [Magidor]
Strong compositionality says meaningful expressions syntactically well-formed are meaningful [Magidor]
Understanding unlimited numbers of sentences suggests that meaning is compositional [Magidor]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
Are there partial propositions, lacking truth value in some possible worlds? [Magidor]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
A sentence can be meaningful, and yet lack a truth value [Magidor]
In the pragmatic approach, presuppositions are assumed in a context, for successful assertion [Magidor]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
The infelicitiousness of trivial truth is explained by uninformativeness, or a static context-set [Magidor]
The infelicitiousness of trivial falsity is explained by expectations, or the loss of a context-set [Magidor]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / c. Presupposition
A presupposition is what makes an utterance sound wrong if it is not assumed? [Magidor]
A test for presupposition would be if it provoked 'hey wait a minute - I have no idea that....' [Magidor]
The best tests for presupposition are projecting it to negation, conditional, conjunction, questions [Magidor]
If both s and not-s entail a sentence p, then p is a presupposition [Magidor]
Why do certain words trigger presuppositions? [Magidor]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / d. Metaphor
One theory says metaphors mean the same as the corresponding simile [Magidor]
Theories of metaphor divide over whether they must have literal meanings [Magidor]
The simile view of metaphors removes their magic, and won't explain why we use them [Magidor]
Maybe a metaphor is just a substitute for what is intended literally, like 'icy' for 'unemotional' [Magidor]
Gricean theories of metaphor involve conversational implicatures based on literal meanings [Magidor]
Non-cognitivist views of metaphor says there are no metaphorical meanings, just effects of the literal [Magidor]
Metaphors tend to involve category mistakes, by joining disjoint domains [Magidor]
Metaphors as substitutes for the literal misses one predicate varying with context [Magidor]