Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Peter Abelard and Marian David

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24 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
18365 If truths are just identical with facts, then truths will make themselves true [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
18362 Examples show that truth-making is just non-symmetric, not asymmetric [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
18360 It is assumed that a proposition is necessarily true if its truth-maker exists [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18358 Two different propositions can have the same fact as truth-maker [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
18355 What matters is truth-making (not truth-makers) [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
18354 Correspondence is symmetric, while truth-making is taken to be asymmetric [David]
18356 Correspondence is an over-ambitious attempt to explain truth-making [David]
18363 Correspondence theorists see facts as the only truth-makers [David]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
18364 Correspondence theory likes ideal languages, that reveal the structure of propositions [David]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
18357 What makes a disjunction true is simpler than the disjunctive fact it names [David]
18359 One proposition can be made true by many different facts [David]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
10397 Abelard's mereology involves privileged and natural divisions, and principal parts [Abelard, by King,P]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
16062 A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16061 If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
16060 Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
16064 The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
18361 A reflexive relation entails that the relation can't be asymmetric [David]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
10396 If 'animal' is wholly present in Socrates and an ass, then 'animal' is rational and irrational [Abelard, by King,P]
10395 Abelard was an irrealist about virtually everything apart from concrete individuals [Abelard, by King,P]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
15384 Only words can be 'predicated of many'; the universality is just in its mode of signifying [Abelard, by Panaccio]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
8481 The de dicto-de re modality distinction dates back to Abelard [Abelard, by Orenstein]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
15385 Abelard's problem is the purely singular aspects of things won't account for abstraction [Panaccio on Abelard]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
15383 Nothing external can truly be predicated of an object [Abelard, by Panaccio]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
10398 Natural kinds are not special; they are just well-defined resemblance collections [Abelard, by King,P]