10 ideas
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16659 | Relations do not add anything to reality, though they are real aspects of the world [Olivi] |
16672 | Quantity is the quantified parts of a thing, plus location and coordination [Olivi] |
16673 | Quantity just adds union and location to the extension of parts [Olivi] |
19696 | There are reasons 'for which' a belief is held, reasons 'why' it is believed, and reasons 'to' believe it [Neta] |
19697 | The basing relation of a reason to a belief should both support and explain the belief [Neta] |
16663 | Things are limited by the species to certain modes of being [Olivi] |