14 ideas
| 8833 | Why should we prefer coherent beliefs? [Klein,P] |
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 8834 | Infinitism avoids a regress, circularity or arbitrariness, by saying warrant just increases [Klein,P] |
| 8838 | If justification is endless, no link in the chain is ultimately justified [Ginet on Klein,P] |
| 8839 | Reasons acquire warrant through being part of a lengthening series [Klein,P] |
| 23146 | Motives produce intentions, which lead to actions [Driver] |
| 23147 | Good intentions are not necessary for virtue [Driver] |
| 23144 | Virtue should be defined by consequences, not by states of mind [Driver] |
| 23148 | Virtues are character traits or dispositions which produce good consequences for others [Driver] |
| 23150 | Control of pregnancy and knowledge of paternity have downgraded chastity [Driver] |
| 23149 | If generosity systematically turned recipients into parasites, it wouldn't be a virtue [Driver] |