14 ideas
| 8833 | Why should we prefer coherent beliefs? [Klein,P] |
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 6375 | The taste of chocolate is a 'finer-grained' sensation than the taste of sweetness [Polger] |
| 8834 | Infinitism avoids a regress, circularity or arbitrariness, by saying warrant just increases [Klein,P] |
| 8838 | If justification is endless, no link in the chain is ultimately justified [Ginet on Klein,P] |
| 8839 | Reasons acquire warrant through being part of a lengthening series [Klein,P] |
| 6381 | The mind and the self are one, and the mind-self is a biological phenomenon [Polger] |
| 6378 | Teleological functions explain why a trait exists; causal-role functions say what it does [Polger] |
| 6380 | Identity theory says consciousness is an abstraction: a state, event, process or property [Polger] |
| 6379 | A mummified heart has the teleological function of circulating blood [Polger] |
| 6377 | Teleological notions of function say what a thing is supposed to do [Polger] |