88 ideas
15186 | In the tenseless view, all times are equally real, so statements of the future have truth-values [Le Poidevin] |
18074 | Intuitionists rely on assertability instead of truth, but assertability relies on truth [Kitcher] |
12430 | Classical logic is our preconditions for assessing empirical evidence [Kitcher] |
12431 | I believe classical logic because I was taught it and use it, but it could be undermined [Kitcher] |
6298 | Kitcher says maths is an idealisation of the world, and our operations in dealing with it [Kitcher, by Resnik] |
12392 | Mathematical a priorism is conceptualist, constructivist or realist [Kitcher] |
18078 | The interest or beauty of mathematics is when it uses current knowledge to advance undestanding [Kitcher] |
12426 | The 'beauty' or 'interest' of mathematics is just explanatory power [Kitcher] |
12395 | Real numbers stand to measurement as natural numbers stand to counting [Kitcher] |
12425 | Complex numbers were only accepted when a geometrical model for them was found [Kitcher] |
18071 | A one-operation is the segregation of a single object [Kitcher] |
18066 | The old view is that mathematics is useful in the world because it describes the world [Kitcher] |
18083 | With infinitesimals, you divide by the time, then set the time to zero [Kitcher] |
18061 | Mathematical intuition is not the type platonism needs [Kitcher] |
12420 | If mathematics comes through intuition, that is either inexplicable, or too subjective [Kitcher] |
12393 | Intuition is no basis for securing a priori knowledge, because it is fallible [Kitcher] |
12387 | Mathematical knowledge arises from basic perception [Kitcher] |
12412 | My constructivism is mathematics as an idealization of collecting and ordering objects [Kitcher] |
18065 | We derive limited mathematics from ordinary things, and erect powerful theories on their basis [Kitcher] |
18077 | The defenders of complex numbers had to show that they could be expressed in physical terms [Kitcher] |
12423 | Analyticity avoids abstract entities, but can there be truth without reference? [Kitcher] |
18069 | Arithmetic is an idealizing theory [Kitcher] |
18068 | Arithmetic is made true by the world, but is also made true by our constructions [Kitcher] |
18070 | We develop a language for correlations, and use it to perform higher level operations [Kitcher] |
18072 | Constructivism is ontological (that it is the work of an agent) and epistemological (knowable a priori) [Kitcher] |
18063 | Conceptualists say we know mathematics a priori by possessing mathematical concepts [Kitcher] |
18064 | If meaning makes mathematics true, you still need to say what the meanings refer to [Kitcher] |
22919 | A thing which makes no difference seems unlikely to exist [Le Poidevin] |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
18067 | Abstract objects were a bad way of explaining the structure in mathematics [Kitcher] |
12428 | Many necessities are inexpressible, and unknowable a priori [Kitcher] |
12429 | Knowing our own existence is a priori, but not necessary [Kitcher] |
12390 | A priori knowledge comes from available a priori warrants that produce truth [Kitcher] |
12418 | In long mathematical proofs we can't remember the original a priori basis [Kitcher] |
12389 | Knowledge is a priori if the experience giving you the concepts thus gives you the knowledge [Kitcher] |
12416 | We have some self-knowledge a priori, such as knowledge of our own existence [Kitcher] |
12413 | A 'warrant' is a process which ensures that a true belief is knowledge [Kitcher] |
20473 | If experiential can defeat a belief, then its justification depends on the defeater's absence [Kitcher, by Casullo] |
15207 | We want illuminating theories, rather than coherent theories [Le Poidevin] |
22926 | In addition to causal explanations, they can also be inferential, or definitional, or purposive [Le Poidevin] |
18075 | Idealisation trades off accuracy for simplicity, in varying degrees [Kitcher] |
22932 | We don't just describe a time as 'now' from a private viewpoint, but as a fact about the world [Le Poidevin] |
6866 | It is disturbing if we become unreal when we die, but if time is unreal, then we remain real after death [Le Poidevin] |
15190 | Evil can't be an illusion, because then the illusion that there is evil would be evil [Le Poidevin] |
6867 | Existentialism focuses on freedom and self-making, and insertion into the world [Le Poidevin] |
22927 | The logical properties of causation are asymmetry, transitivity and irreflexivity [Le Poidevin] |
22922 | We can identify unoccupied points in space, so they must exist [Le Poidevin] |
22924 | If spatial points exist, then they must be stationary, by definition [Le Poidevin] |
22923 | Absolute space explains actual and potential positions, and geometrical truths [Le Poidevin] |
22928 | For relationists moving an object beyond the edge of space creates new space [Le Poidevin] |
22931 | We distinguish time from space, because it passes, and it has a unique present moment [Le Poidevin] |
22917 | Since nothing occurs in a temporal vacuum, there is no way to measure its length [Le Poidevin] |
22921 | Temporal vacuums would be unexperienced, unmeasured, and unending [Le Poidevin] |
15195 | If the future is not real, we don't seem to have any obligation to future individuals [Le Poidevin] |
15188 | If things don't persist through time, then change makes no sense [Le Poidevin] |
22934 | Time can't speed up or slow down, so it doesn't seem to be a 'process' [Le Poidevin] |
15191 | At the very least, minds themselves seem to be tensed [Le Poidevin] |
15197 | Fiction seems to lack a tensed perspective, and offers an example of tenseless language [Le Poidevin] |
15206 | It is the view of the future that really decides between tensed and tenseless views of time [Le Poidevin] |
15198 | In the B-series, time-positions are unchanging; in the A-series they change (from future to present to past) [Le Poidevin] |
15189 | Things which have ceased change their A-series position; things that persist change their B-series position [Le Poidevin] |
6865 | A-theory says past, present, future and flow exist; B-theory says this just reports our perspective [Le Poidevin] |
15187 | It is claimed that the tense view entails the unreality of both future and past [Le Poidevin] |
15205 | Tensed theorists typically try to reduce the tenseless to the tensed [Le Poidevin] |
15192 | We share a common now, but not a common here [Le Poidevin] |
15193 | The new tenseless theory offers indexical truth-conditions, instead of a reductive analysis [Le Poidevin] |
22938 | To say that the past causes the present needs them both to be equally real [Le Poidevin] |
22939 | The B-series doesn't seem to allow change [Le Poidevin] |
22940 | If the B-universe is eternal, why am I trapped in a changing moment of it? [Le Poidevin] |
22953 | Time's arrow is not causal if there is no temporal gap between cause and effect [Le Poidevin] |
22947 | An ordered series can be undirected, but time favours moving from earlier to later [Le Poidevin] |
22952 | If time's arrow is causal, how can there be non-simultaneous events that are causally unconnected? [Le Poidevin] |
22951 | If time's arrow is psychological then different minds can impose different orders on events [Le Poidevin] |
22948 | There are Thermodynamic, Psychological and Causal arrows of time [Le Poidevin] |
22949 | Presumably if time's arrow is thermodynamic then time ends when entropy is complete [Le Poidevin] |
22950 | If time is thermodynamic then entropy is necessary - but the theory says it is probable [Le Poidevin] |
22943 | Instantaneous motion is an intrinsic disposition to be elsewhere [Le Poidevin] |
22945 | The dynamic view of motion says it is primitive, and not reducible to objects, properties and times [Le Poidevin] |
22937 | If the present could have diverse pasts, then past truths can't have present truthmakers [Le Poidevin] |
22925 | The present is the past/future boundary, so the first moment of time was not present [Le Poidevin] |
22944 | The primitive parts of time are intervals, not instants [Le Poidevin] |
22942 | If time is infinitely divisible, then the present must be infinitely short [Le Poidevin] |
22946 | The multiverse is distinct time-series, as well as spaces [Le Poidevin] |
15196 | God being inside or outside of time both raise a group of difficult problems [Le Poidevin] |
22941 | How could a timeless God know what time it is? So could God be both timeless and omniscient? [Le Poidevin] |