12 ideas
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 19696 | There are reasons 'for which' a belief is held, reasons 'why' it is believed, and reasons 'to' believe it [Neta] |
| 19697 | The basing relation of a reason to a belief should both support and explain the belief [Neta] |
| 20877 | Errors in moral practice might be inconsistent or inappropriate principles, or inappropriate application [LaFollette] |
| 20878 | We can discuss the criteria of a judgment, or the weight given to them, or their application [LaFollette] |
| 20881 | The act/omission distinction is important for duties, but less so for consequences [LaFollette] |
| 20886 | Are we only obligated by agreement, or should we always help the weak? [LaFollette] |
| 20879 | Too many options may open us to unwanted pressures, like being paid very little [LaFollette] |
| 20880 | Should people be forced to make choices? [LaFollette] |