12 ideas
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 19696 | There are reasons 'for which' a belief is held, reasons 'why' it is believed, and reasons 'to' believe it [Neta] |
| 19697 | The basing relation of a reason to a belief should both support and explain the belief [Neta] |
| 411 | If we succeed in speaking the truth, we cannot know we have done it [Xenophanes] |
| 412 | If God had not created honey, men would say figs are sweeter [Xenophanes] |
| 1640 | The basic Eleatic belief was that all things are one [Xenophanes, by Plato] |
| 3055 | Xenophanes said the essence of God was spherical and utterly inhuman [Xenophanes, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 408 | Ethiopian gods have black hair, and Thracian gods have red hair [Xenophanes] |
| 407 | Mortals believe gods are born, and have voices and clothes just like mortals [Xenophanes] |