Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Richard G. Heck and Thomas W. Polger

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21 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
17453 The meaning of a number isn't just the numerals leading up to it [Heck]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / f. Cardinal numbers
17457 A basic grasp of cardinal numbers needs an understanding of equinumerosity [Heck]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
17448 In counting, numerals are used, not mentioned (as objects that have to correlated) [Heck]
17455 Is counting basically mindless, and independent of the cardinality involved? [Heck]
17456 Counting is the assignment of successively larger cardinal numbers to collections [Heck]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / e. Counting by correlation
17450 Understanding 'just as many' needn't involve grasping one-one correspondence [Heck]
17451 We can know 'just as many' without the concepts of equinumerosity or numbers [Heck]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
17459 Frege's Theorem explains why the numbers satisfy the Peano axioms [Heck]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
17454 Children can use numbers, without a concept of them as countable objects [Heck]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
17458 Equinumerosity is not the same concept as one-one correspondence [Heck]
17449 We can understand cardinality without the idea of one-one correspondence [Heck]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
16062 A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16061 If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
16060 Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
16064 The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
6375 The taste of chocolate is a 'finer-grained' sensation than the taste of sweetness [Polger]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 1. Self and Consciousness
6381 The mind and the self are one, and the mind-self is a biological phenomenon [Polger]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 5. Teleological Functionalism
6378 Teleological functions explain why a trait exists; causal-role functions say what it does [Polger]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
6380 Identity theory says consciousness is an abstraction: a state, event, process or property [Polger]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
6379 A mummified heart has the teleological function of circulating blood [Polger]
6377 Teleological notions of function say what a thing is supposed to do [Polger]