7 ideas
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
19378 | Early modern possibility is what occurs sometime; for Leibniz, it is what is not contradictory [Arthur,R] |
1799 | If we can't know minds, we can't know if Pyrrho was a sceptic [Theodosius, by Diog. Laertius] |
19380 | Occasionalism contradicts the Eucharist, which needs genuine changes of substance [Arthur,R] |