141 ideas
| 16440 | I don't think Lewis's cost-benefit reflective equilibrium approach offers enough guidance [Stalnaker] |
| 23657 | The existence of tensed verbs shows that not all truths are necessary truths [Reid] |
| 23655 | An ad hominem argument is good, if it is shown that the man's principles are inconsistent [Reid] |
| 16468 | Non-S5 can talk of contingent or necessary necessities [Stalnaker] |
| 18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
| 16449 | In modal set theory, sets only exist in a possible world if that world contains all of its members [Stalnaker] |
| 12766 | Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker] |
| 16464 | We regiment to get semantic structure, for evaluating arguments, and understanding complexities [Stalnaker] |
| 16465 | In 'S was F or some other than S was F', the disjuncts need S, but the whole disjunction doesn't [Stalnaker] |
| 16405 | To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker] |
| 23634 | Accepting the existence of anything presupposes the notion of existence [Reid] |
| 16434 | Some say what exists must do so, and nothing else could possible exist [Stalnaker] |
| 16439 | A nominalist view says existence is having spatio-temporal location [Stalnaker] |
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16443 | Properties are modal, involving possible situations where they are exemplified [Stalnaker] |
| 16471 | I accept a hierarchy of properties of properties of properties [Stalnaker] |
| 23664 | Powers are quite distinct and simple, and so cannot be defined [Reid] |
| 23669 | Thinkers say that matter has intrinsic powers, but is also passive and acted upon [Reid] |
| 23666 | It is obvious that there could not be a power without a subject which possesses it [Reid] |
| 16452 | Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually [Stalnaker] |
| 23651 | Universals are not objects of sense and cannot be imagined - but can be conceived [Reid] |
| 23650 | Only individuals exist [Reid] |
| 23649 | No one thinks two sheets possess a single whiteness, but all agree they are both white [Reid] |
| 14617 | Predicates can't apply to what doesn't exist [Stalnaker] |
| 12764 | For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker] |
| 16407 | Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker] |
| 23647 | Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid] |
| 12761 | An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker] |
| 16467 | 'Socrates is essentially human' seems to say nothing could be Socrates if it was not human [Stalnaker] |
| 12763 | Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker] |
| 12762 | Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker] |
| 1350 | Continuity is needed for existence, otherwise we would say a thing existed after it ceased to exist [Reid] |
| 21322 | We treat slowly changing things as identical for the sake of economy in language [Reid] |
| 21320 | Identity is familiar to common sense, but very hard to define [Reid] |
| 1367 | Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence [Reid] |
| 11874 | Real identity admits of no degrees [Reid] |
| 16453 | The bundle theory makes the identity of indiscernibles a necessity, since the thing is the properties [Stalnaker] |
| 16466 | Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false [Stalnaker] |
| 14286 | In nearby worlds where A is true, 'if A,B' is true or false if B is true or false [Stalnaker] |
| 10994 | Conditionals are true if minimal revision of the antecedent verifies the consequent [Stalnaker, by Read] |
| 16438 | Necessity and possibility are fundamental, and there can be no reductive analysis of them [Stalnaker] |
| 16422 | The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker] |
| 16423 | Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker] |
| 16436 | Modal concepts are central to the actual world, and shouldn't need extravagant metaphysics [Stalnaker] |
| 16421 | Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part [Stalnaker] |
| 11958 | Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar] |
| 16429 | A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker] |
| 16397 | If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker] |
| 16399 | Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker] |
| 16398 | Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker] |
| 16433 | Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones? [Stalnaker] |
| 14285 | A possible world is the ontological analogue of hypothetical beliefs [Stalnaker] |
| 15793 | We can take 'ways things might have been' as irreducible elements in our ontology [Stalnaker, by Lycan] |
| 16396 | Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker] |
| 16437 | Possible worlds are properties [Stalnaker] |
| 16444 | Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure [Stalnaker] |
| 16445 | I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space [Stalnaker] |
| 12765 | Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker] |
| 16408 | Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker] |
| 16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
| 16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
| 16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
| 16454 | Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics [Stalnaker] |
| 16450 | Anti-haecceitism says there is no more to an individual than meeting some qualitative conditions [Stalnaker] |
| 23659 | If someone denies that he is thinking when he is conscious of it, we can only laugh [Reid] |
| 23662 | The existence of ideas is no more obvious than the existence of external objects [Reid] |
| 23661 | We are only aware of other beings through our senses; without that, we are alone in the universe [Reid] |
| 23635 | Truths are self-evident to sensible persons who understand them clearly without prejudice [Reid] |
| 7631 | Sensation is not committed to any external object, but perception is [Reid] |
| 23637 | Primary qualities are the object of mathematics [Reid] |
| 23638 | Secondary qualities conjure up, and are confused with, the sensations which produce them [Reid] |
| 23639 | It is unclear whether a toothache is in the mind or in the tooth, but the word has a single meaning [Reid] |
| 6492 | Reid is seen as the main direct realist of the eighteenth century [Reid, by Robinson,H] |
| 23633 | Many truths seem obvious, and point to universal agreement - which is what we find [Reid] |
| 23654 | In obscure matters the few must lead the many, but the many usually lead in common sense [Reid] |
| 23644 | Without memory we could have no concept of duration [Reid] |
| 23643 | We all trust our distinct memories (but not our distinct imaginings) [Reid] |
| 23660 | The theory of ideas, popular with philosophers, means past existence has to be proved [Reid] |
| 23641 | People dislike believing without evidence, and try to avoid it [Reid] |
| 23642 | If non-rational evidence reaches us, it is reason which then makes use of it [Reid] |
| 23549 | We treat testimony with a natural trade off of belief and caution [Reid, by Fricker,M] |
| 1356 | A person is a unity, and doesn't come in degrees [Reid] |
| 23658 | Consciousness is an indefinable and unique operation [Reid] |
| 23665 | Consciousness is the power of mind to know itself, and minds are grounded in powers [Reid] |
| 1359 | Personal identity is the basis of all rights, obligations and responsibility [Reid] |
| 21319 | I can hardly care about rational consequence if it wasn't me conceiving the antecedent [Reid] |
| 21323 | The identity of a thief is only known by similarity, but memory gives certainty in our own case [Reid] |
| 21321 | Memory reveals my past identity - but so does testimony of other witnesses [Reid] |
| 21324 | If consciousness is transferable 20 persons can be 1; forgetting implies 1 can be 20 [Reid] |
| 21325 | Boy same as young man, young man same as old man, old man not boy, if forgotten! [Reid] |
| 21327 | If a stolen horse is identified by similitude, its identity is not therefore merely similitude [Reid] |
| 1366 | If consciousness is personal identity, it is continually changing [Reid] |
| 1352 | Thoughts change continually, but the self doesn't [Reid] |
| 23681 | The first motion or effect cannot be produced necessarily, so the First Cause must be a free agent [Reid] |
| 23676 | A willed action needs reasonable understanding of what is to be done [Reid] |
| 23668 | Our own nature attributes free determinations to our own will [Reid] |
| 23680 | We are morally free, because we experience it, we are accountable, and we pursue projects [Reid] |
| 23652 | We must first conceive things before we can consider them [Reid] |
| 23656 | The structure of languages reveals a uniformity in basic human opinions [Reid] |
| 23630 | Only philosophers treat ideas as objects [Reid] |
| 16428 | Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker] |
| 16474 | How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know? [Stalnaker] |
| 23648 | First we notice and name attributes ('abstracting'); then we notice that subjects share them ('generalising') [Reid] |
| 23653 | If you can't distinguish the features of a complex object, your notion of it would be a muddle [Reid] |
| 23640 | Only mature minds can distinguish the qualities of a body [Reid] |
| 16406 | If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker] |
| 23629 | The ambiguity of words impedes the advancement of knowledge [Reid] |
| 23646 | Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description [Reid] |
| 16404 | In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker] |
| 16432 | One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker] |
| 23645 | A word's meaning is the thing conceived, as fixed by linguistic experts [Reid] |
| 16403 | 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker] |
| 16461 | We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language [Stalnaker] |
| 16401 | To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker] |
| 16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |
| 16448 | Possible world semantics may not reduce modality, but it can explain it [Stalnaker] |
| 16430 | Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker] |
| 16431 | In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker] |
| 16442 | I take propositions to be truth conditions [Stalnaker] |
| 16447 | A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth [Stalnaker] |
| 14616 | A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence of individual, properties and relations [Stalnaker] |
| 16446 | Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker] |
| 18052 | An assertion aims to add to the content of a context [Stalnaker, by Magidor] |
| 14718 | An assertion is an attempt to rule out certain possibilities, narrowing things down for good planning [Stalnaker, by Schroeter] |
| 20051 | Reid said that agent causation is a unique type of causation [Reid, by Stout,R] |
| 23678 | A motive is merely an idea, like advice, and not a force for action [Reid] |
| 23663 | There are axioms of taste - such as a general consensus about a beautiful face [Reid] |
| 23674 | If an attempted poisoning results in benefits, we still judge the agent a poisoner [Reid] |
| 23675 | We shouldn't do to others what would be a wrong to us in similar circumstances [Reid] |
| 23672 | To be virtuous, we must care about duty [Reid] |
| 23673 | Every worthy man has a principle of honour, and knows what is honourable [Reid] |
| 23632 | Similar effects come from similar causes, and causes are only what are sufficient for the effects [Reid] |
| 8383 | Day and night are constantly conjoined, but they don't cause one another [Reid, by Crane] |
| 23677 | We all know that mere priority or constant conjunction do not have to imply causation [Reid] |
| 23667 | Regular events don't imply a cause, without an innate conviction of universal causation [Reid] |
| 23679 | The principle of the law of nature is that matter is passive, and is acted upon [Reid] |
| 23670 | Scientists don't know the cause of magnetism, and only discover its regulations [Reid] |
| 23671 | Laws are rules for effects, but these need a cause; rules of navigation don't navigate [Reid] |