50 ideas
6575 | Philosophy may never find foundations, and may undermine our lives in the process [Fogelin] |
6585 | Rationality is threatened by fear of inconsistency, illusions of absolutes or relativism, and doubt [Fogelin] |
6557 | Humans may never be able to attain a world view which is both rich and consistent [Fogelin] |
6568 | A game can be played, despite having inconsistent rules [Fogelin] |
6560 | The law of noncontradiction is traditionally the most basic principle of rationality [Fogelin] |
6565 | The law of noncontradiction makes the distinction between asserting something and denying it [Fogelin] |
6574 | Legal reasoning is analogical, not deductive [Fogelin] |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
6582 | Conventions can only work if they are based on something non-conventional [Fogelin] |
17979 | Research shows perceptual discrimination is sharper at category boundaries [Murphy] |
6576 | My view is 'circumspect rationalism' - that only our intellect can comprehend the world [Fogelin] |
6589 | Knowledge is legitimate only if all relevant defeaters have been eliminated [Fogelin] |
6596 | For coherentists, circularity is acceptable if the circle is large, rich and coherent [Fogelin] |
6597 | A rule of justification might be: don't raise the level of scrutiny without a good reason [Fogelin] |
6588 | Scepticism is cartesian (sceptical scenarios), or Humean (future), or Pyrrhonian (suspend belief) [Fogelin] |
6590 | Scepticism deals in remote possibilities that are ineliminable and set the standard very high [Fogelin] |
6583 | Radical perspectivism replaces Kant's necessary scheme with many different schemes [Fogelin] |
18690 | Induction is said to just compare properties of categories, but the type of property also matters [Murphy] |
6555 | We are also irrational, with a unique ability to believe in bizarre self-created fictions [Fogelin] |
17980 | The main theories of concepts are exemplar, prototype and knowledge [Murphy] |
17973 | The theoretical and practical definitions for the classical view are very hard to find [Murphy] |
17969 | The classical definitional approach cannot distinguish typical and atypical category members [Murphy] |
17970 | Classical concepts follow classical logic, but concepts in real life don't work that way [Murphy] |
17971 | Classical concepts are transitive hierarchies, but actual categories may be intransitive [Murphy] |
17972 | The classical core is meant to be the real concept, but actually seems unimportant [Murphy] |
17975 | There is no 'ideal' bird or dog, and prototypes give no information about variability [Murphy] |
17976 | Prototypes are unified representations of the entire category (rather than of members) [Murphy] |
18691 | The prototype theory uses observed features, but can't include their construction [Murphy] |
17983 | The prototype theory handles hierarchical categories and combinations of concepts well [Murphy] |
17985 | Prototypes theory of concepts is best, as a full description with weighted typical features [Murphy] |
17986 | Learning concepts is forming prototypes with a knowledge structure [Murphy] |
17974 | The most popular theories of concepts are based on prototypes or exemplars [Murphy] |
17977 | The exemplar view of concepts says 'dogs' is the set of dogs I remember [Murphy] |
17982 | Exemplar theory struggles with hierarchical classification and with induction [Murphy] |
17981 | Children using knowing and essentialist categories doesn't fit the exemplar view [Murphy] |
17984 | Conceptual combination must be compositional, and can't be built up from exemplars [Murphy] |
17987 | The concept of birds from exemplars must also be used in inductions about birds [Murphy] |
17978 | We do not learn concepts in isolation, but as an integrated part of broader knowledge [Murphy] |
18687 | Concepts with familiar contents are easier to learn [Murphy] |
18688 | Some knowledge is involved in instant use of categories, other knowledge in explanations [Murphy] |
18689 | People categorise things consistent with their knowledge, even rejecting some good evidence [Murphy] |
6605 | Critics must be causally entangled with their subject matter [Fogelin] |
6607 | The word 'beautiful', when deprived of context, is nearly contentless [Fogelin] |
6604 | Saying 'It's all a matter to taste' ignores the properties of the object discussed [Fogelin] |
6586 | Cynics are committed to morality, but disappointed or disgusted by human failings [Fogelin] |
6572 | Deterrence, prevention, rehabilitation and retribution can come into conflict in punishments [Fogelin] |
6573 | Retributivists say a crime can be 'paid for'; deterrentists still worry about potential victims [Fogelin] |