Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Robin Le Poidevin and Thomas Mautner

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82 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Linguistic philosophy approaches problems by attending to actual linguistic usage [Mautner]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Analytic philosophy studies the unimportant, and sharpens tools instead of using them [Mautner]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
The 'hermeneutic circle' says parts and wholes are interdependent, and so cannot be interpreted [Mautner]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
'Real' definitions give the essential properties of things under a concept [Mautner]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
'Contextual definitions' replace whole statements, not just expressions [Mautner]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 9. Recursive Definition
Recursive definition defines each instance from a previous instance [Mautner]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 10. Stipulative Definition
A stipulative definition lays down that an expression is to have a certain meaning [Mautner]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
Ostensive definitions point to an object which an expression denotes [Mautner]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 5. Fallacy of Composition
The fallacy of composition is the assumption that what is true of the parts is true of the whole [Mautner]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 10. Making Future Truths
In the tenseless view, all times are equally real, so statements of the future have truth-values [Le Poidevin]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic
Fuzzy logic is based on the notion that there can be membership of a set to some degree [Mautner]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 6. Entailment
Entailment is logical requirement; it may be not(p and not-q), but that has problems [Mautner]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 7. Strict Implication
Strict implication says false propositions imply everything, and everything implies true propositions [Mautner]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 8. Material Implication
'Material implication' is defined as 'not(p and not-q)', but seems to imply a connection between p and q [Mautner]
A person who 'infers' draws the conclusion, but a person who 'implies' leaves it to the audience [Mautner]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
Vagueness seems to be inconsistent with the view that every proposition is true or false [Mautner]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Quantifiers turn an open sentence into one to which a truth-value can be assigned [Mautner]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
A thing which makes no difference seems unlikely to exist [Le Poidevin]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Counterfactuals presuppose a belief (or a fact) that the condition is false [Mautner]
Counterfactuals are not true, they are merely valid [Mautner]
Counterfactuals are true if in every world close to actual where p is the case, q is also the case [Mautner]
Counterfactuals say 'If it had been, or were, p, then it would be q' [Mautner]
Maybe counterfactuals are only true if they contain valid inference from premisses [Mautner]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
Essentialism is often identified with belief in 'de re' necessary truths [Mautner]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
Fallibilism is the view that all knowledge-claims are provisional [Mautner]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
'Sense-data' arrived in 1910, but it denotes ideas in Locke, Berkeley and Hume [Mautner]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
We want illuminating theories, rather than coherent theories [Le Poidevin]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Observing lots of green x can confirm 'all x are green' or 'all x are grue', where 'grue' is arbitrary [Mautner, by PG]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
'All x are y' is equivalent to 'all non-y are non-x', so observing paper is white confirms 'ravens are black' [Mautner, by PG]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
In addition to causal explanations, they can also be inferential, or definitional, or purposive [Le Poidevin]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
The references of indexicals ('there', 'now', 'I') depend on the circumstances of utterance [Mautner]
We don't just describe a time as 'now' from a private viewpoint, but as a fact about the world [Le Poidevin]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
Double effect is the distinction between what is foreseen and what is intended [Mautner]
Double effect acts need goodness, unintended evil, good not caused by evil, and outweighing [Mautner]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
'Essentialism' is opposed to existentialism, and claims there is a human nature [Mautner]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
It is disturbing if we become unreal when we die, but if time is unreal, then we remain real after death [Le Poidevin]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
Evil can't be an illusion, because then the illusion that there is evil would be evil [Le Poidevin]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
Existentialism focuses on freedom and self-making, and insertion into the world [Le Poidevin]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
The logical properties of causation are asymmetry, transitivity and irreflexivity [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
We can identify unoccupied points in space, so they must exist [Le Poidevin]
If spatial points exist, then they must be stationary, by definition [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
Absolute space explains actual and potential positions, and geometrical truths [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
For relationists moving an object beyond the edge of space creates new space [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
We distinguish time from space, because it passes, and it has a unique present moment [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / e. Eventless time
Since nothing occurs in a temporal vacuum, there is no way to measure its length [Le Poidevin]
Temporal vacuums would be unexperienced, unmeasured, and unending [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
If the future is not real, we don't seem to have any obligation to future individuals [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
If things don't persist through time, then change makes no sense [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / b. Rate of time
Time can't speed up or slow down, so it doesn't seem to be a 'process' [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
At the very least, minds themselves seem to be tensed [Le Poidevin]
Fiction seems to lack a tensed perspective, and offers an example of tenseless language [Le Poidevin]
It is the view of the future that really decides between tensed and tenseless views of time [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
In the B-series, time-positions are unchanging; in the A-series they change (from future to present to past) [Le Poidevin]
Things which have ceased change their A-series position; things that persist change their B-series position [Le Poidevin]
A-theory says past, present, future and flow exist; B-theory says this just reports our perspective [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
It is claimed that the tense view entails the unreality of both future and past [Le Poidevin]
Tensed theorists typically try to reduce the tenseless to the tensed [Le Poidevin]
We share a common now, but not a common here [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
The new tenseless theory offers indexical truth-conditions, instead of a reductive analysis [Le Poidevin]
To say that the past causes the present needs them both to be equally real [Le Poidevin]
The B-series doesn't seem to allow change [Le Poidevin]
If the B-universe is eternal, why am I trapped in a changing moment of it? [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
Time's arrow is not causal if there is no temporal gap between cause and effect [Le Poidevin]
An ordered series can be undirected, but time favours moving from earlier to later [Le Poidevin]
If time's arrow is causal, how can there be non-simultaneous events that are causally unconnected? [Le Poidevin]
If time's arrow is psychological then different minds can impose different orders on events [Le Poidevin]
There are Thermodynamic, Psychological and Causal arrows of time [Le Poidevin]
Presumably if time's arrow is thermodynamic then time ends when entropy is complete [Le Poidevin]
If time is thermodynamic then entropy is necessary - but the theory says it is probable [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / i. Time and motion
Instantaneous motion is an intrinsic disposition to be elsewhere [Le Poidevin]
The dynamic view of motion says it is primitive, and not reducible to objects, properties and times [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
If the present could have diverse pasts, then past truths can't have present truthmakers [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / a. Beginning of time
The present is the past/future boundary, so the first moment of time was not present [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / c. Intervals
The primitive parts of time are intervals, not instants [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
If time is infinitely divisible, then the present must be infinitely short [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 10. Multiverse
The multiverse is distinct time-series, as well as spaces [Le Poidevin]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
God being inside or outside of time both raise a group of difficult problems [Le Poidevin]
How could a timeless God know what time it is? So could God be both timeless and omniscient? [Le Poidevin]