11 ideas
13831 | Logic is based on transitions between sentences [Prawitz] |
13827 | Logical consequence isn't a black box (Tarski's approach); we should explain how arguments work [Prawitz] |
13825 | Natural deduction introduction rules may represent 'definitions' of logical connectives [Prawitz] |
13823 | In natural deduction, inferences are atomic steps involving just one logical constant [Prawitz] |
13826 | Model theory looks at valid sentences and consequence, but not how we know these things [Prawitz] |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
12582 | The function of beliefs is to produce beliefs-that-p when p [Millikan] |
23801 | Biosemantics says content is useful mapping from a producer to a consumer system [Millikan, by Schulte] |