9 ideas
19086 | Does the pragmatic theory of meaning support objective truth, or make it impossible? [Macbeth] |
15381 | Dyamic logics model changes between classical states, in action, belief, and computing [Uckelman] |
19093 | Greek mathematics is wholly sensory, where ours is wholly inferential [Macbeth] |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
19091 | Seeing reality mathematically makes it an object of thought, not of experience [Macbeth] |
19088 | For pragmatists a concept means its consequences [Macbeth] |