330 ideas
23889 | Among the Greeks Aristotle is the only philosopher in the modern style [Weil] |
23881 | All thought about values is philosophical, and thought about anything else is not philosophy [Weil] |
12644 | Who cares what 'philosophy' is? Most pre-1950 thought doesn't now count as philosophy [Fodor] |
23885 | Philosophy aims to change the soul, not to accumulate knowledge [Weil] |
23886 | Systems are not unique to each philosopher. The platonist tradition is old and continuous [Weil] |
12633 | Definitions often give necessary but not sufficient conditions for an extension [Fodor] |
2474 | It seems likely that analysis of concepts is impossible, but justification can survive without it [Fodor] |
2481 | Despite all the efforts of philosophers, nothing can ever be reduced to anything [Fodor] |
24215 | We call experience 'objective' when it seems necessary [Weil] |
2463 | A standard naturalist view is realist, externalist, and computationalist, and believes in rationality [Fodor] |
2505 | Turing invented the idea of mechanical rationality (just based on syntax) [Fodor] |
12619 | We have no successful definitions, because they all use indefinable words [Fodor] |
2470 | Transcendental arguments move from knowing Q to knowing P because it depends on Q [Fodor] |
23884 | Truth is a value of thought [Weil] |
23877 | Most people won't question an idea's truth if they depend on it [Weil] |
23755 | Genius and love of truth are always accompanied by great humility [Weil] |
23825 | We seek truth only because it is good [Weil] |
23853 | Truth is not a object we love - it is the radiant manifestation of reality [Weil] |
2435 | Psychology has to include the idea that mental processes are typically truth-preserving [Fodor] |
2442 | Inferences are surely part of the causal structure of the world [Fodor] |
12664 | A truth-table, not inferential role, defines 'and' [Fodor] |
3005 | 'Jocasta' needs to be distinguished from 'Oedipus's mother' because they are connected by different properties [Fodor] |
12648 | Names in thought afford a primitive way to bring John before the mind [Fodor] |
12650 | 'Paderewski' has two names in mentalese, for his pianist file and his politician file [Fodor] |
12656 | P-and-Q gets its truth from the truth of P and truth of Q, but consistency isn't like that [Fodor] |
12620 | If 'exist' is ambiguous in 'chairs and numbers exist', that mirrors the difference between chairs and numbers [Fodor] |
24189 | The criterion of the real is contradictions [Weil] |
23855 | Creation produced a network or web of determinations [Weil] |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
24208 | Bodies classify things prior to thought (such as chicks knowing what hits of the egg to peck) [Weil] |
2469 | The world is full of messy small things producing stable large-scale properties (e.g. mountains) [Fodor] |
7014 | A particle and a coin heads-or-tails pick out to perfectly well-defined predicates and properties [Fodor] |
12613 | Empiricists use dispositions reductively, as 'possibility of sensation' or 'possibility of experimental result' [Fodor] |
2475 | Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example [Fodor] |
12653 | There's statistical, logical, nomological, conceptual and metaphysical possibility [Fodor] |
23900 | Chance is compatible with necessity, and the two occur together [Weil] |
24194 | Wanting new discoveries blocks good thinking about what has been discovered [Weil] |
24195 | Don't reject opinions; arrange them all in a hierarchy [Weil] |
12651 | Some beliefs are only inferred when needed, like 'Shakespeare had not telephone' [Fodor] |
2502 | How do you count beliefs? [Fodor] |
12628 | Knowing that must come before knowing how [Fodor] |
23888 | Knowledge is beyond question, as an unavoidable component of thinking [Weil] |
2501 | Berkeley seems to have mistakenly thought that chairs are the same as after-images [Fodor] |
3008 | Evolution suggests that innate knowledge of human psychology would be beneficial [Fodor] |
3009 | Sticklebacks have an innate idea that red things are rivals [Fodor] |
2990 | Contrary to commonsense, most of what is in the mind seems to be unlearned [Fodor] |
24209 | Senses are unaware of each other, and give isolated information [Weil] |
2465 | Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved [Fodor] |
2504 | Rationalism can be based on an evolved computational brain with innate structure [Fodor] |
24211 | Associations are not lawlike, because we make arbitrary choice of which representation matters [Weil] |
3978 | Associations are held to connect Ideas together in the way the world is connected together [Fodor] |
12617 | Associationism can't explain how truth is preserved [Fodor] |
2493 | According to empiricists abstraction is the fundamental mental process [Fodor] |
24214 | Pragmatists are right that science is action on nature - but it must be methodical [Weil] |
12625 | Pragmatism is the worst idea ever [Fodor] |
2494 | Rationalists say there is more to a concept than the experience that prompts it [Fodor] |
2462 | Control of belief is possible if you know truth conditions and what causes beliefs [Fodor] |
2454 | We can deliberately cause ourselves to have true thoughts - hence the value of experiments [Fodor] |
2455 | Interrogation and experiment submit us to having beliefs caused [Fodor] |
2460 | Participation in an experiment requires agreement about what the outcome will mean [Fodor] |
2461 | An experiment is a deliberate version of what informal thinking does all the time [Fodor] |
2458 | Theories are links in the causal chain between the environment and our beliefs [Fodor] |
24213 | Explanations always concern how one thing changes into another [Weil] |
2503 | Empirical approaches see mind connections as mirrors/maps of reality [Fodor] |
2508 | The function of a mind is obvious [Fodor] |
12636 | Mental states have causal powers [Fodor] |
2994 | In CRTT thought may be represented, content must be [Fodor] |
2443 | I say psychology is intentional, semantics is informational, and thinking is computation [Fodor] |
2453 | We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts [Fodor] |
15473 | How does anything get outside itself? [Fodor, by Martin,CB] |
2485 | Do intentional states explain our behaviour? [Fodor] |
2981 | Is intentionality outwardly folk psychology, inwardly mentalese? [Lyons on Fodor] |
7326 | Intentionality doesn't go deep enough to appear on the physicists' ultimate list of things [Fodor] |
15494 | We can't use propositions to explain intentional attitudes, because they would need explaining [Fodor] |
3976 | Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws [Fodor] |
3980 | Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols [Fodor] |
24210 | Abstraction is just the character of generalisation [Weil] |
24212 | We don't infer the straight from the twisted, because judging the twisted needs the straight [Weil] |
12661 | The different types of resemblance don't resemble one another [Fodor] |
2506 | If I have a set of mental modules, someone had better be in charge of them! [Fodor] |
23747 | What is sacred is not a person, but the whole physical human being [Weil] |
24207 | Observing oneself in the present is impossible, and oneself in the past may be wrong [Weil] |
24182 | We must be obedient, and love necessity [Weil] |
2445 | Semantics v syntax is the interaction problem all over again [Fodor] |
2446 | Cartesians consider interaction to be a miracle [Fodor] |
2599 | Either intentionality causes things, or epiphenomenalism is true [Fodor] |
3001 | Behaviourism has no theory of mental causation [Fodor] |
2467 | Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation [Fodor] |
2993 | Any piece of software can always be hard-wired [Fodor] |
12632 | In the Representational view, concepts play the key linking role [Fodor] |
3011 | Causal powers must be a crucial feature of mental states [Fodor] |
5498 | Mind is a set of hierarchical 'homunculi', which are made up in turn from subcomponents [Fodor, by Lycan] |
2597 | Contrary to the 'anomalous monist' view, there may well be intentional causal laws [Fodor] |
2489 | Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers [Fodor] |
2985 | Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"? [Lyons on Fodor] |
2995 | Supervenience gives good support for mental causation [Fodor] |
2464 | Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds [Fodor] |
2468 | Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism [Fodor] |
2447 | Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind [Fodor] |
2490 | Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas' [Fodor] |
12624 | Only the labels of nodes have semantic content in connectionism, and they play no role [Fodor] |
2991 | Hume's associationism offers no explanation at all of rational thought [Fodor] |
3002 | If mind is just physical, how can it follow the rules required for intelligent thought? [Fodor] |
2598 | Lots of physical properties are multiply realisable, so why shouldn't beliefs be? [Fodor] |
3981 | Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable [Fodor] |
12641 | Connectionism gives no account of how constituents make complex concepts [Fodor] |
23756 | The mind is imprisoned and limited by language, restricting our awareness of wider thoughts [Weil] |
2992 | We may be able to explain rationality mechanically [Fodor] |
2476 | The goal of thought is to understand the world, not instantly sort it into conceptual categories [Fodor] |
12640 | Associative thinking avoids syntax, but can't preserve sense, reference or truth [Fodor] |
2440 | Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way [Fodor] |
24177 | Higher emotions have less energy, and actions may need the lower emotions [Weil] |
2988 | Folk psychology is the only explanation of behaviour we have [Fodor] |
3975 | Folk psychology explains behaviour by reference to intentional states like belief and desire [Fodor] |
2450 | Rationality has mental properties - autonomy, productivity, experiment [Fodor] |
2499 | Modules analyse stimuli, they don't tell you what to do [Fodor] |
2509 | Modules have in-built specialist information [Fodor] |
22186 | Mental modules are specialised, automatic, and isolated [Fodor, by Okasha] |
2491 | Modules have encapsulation, inaccessibility, private concepts, innateness [Fodor] |
2497 | Something must take an overview of the modules [Fodor] |
2495 | Obvious modules are language and commonsense explanation [Fodor] |
2496 | Blindness doesn't destroy spatial concepts [Fodor] |
2507 | Rationality rises above modules [Fodor] |
2500 | Babies talk in consistent patterns [Fodor] |
2498 | Modules make the world manageable [Fodor] |
2483 | Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning [Fodor] |
2487 | Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language [Fodor] |
2480 | Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't [Fodor] |
12643 | Ambiguities in English are the classic reason for claiming that we don't think in English [Fodor] |
8090 | Since the language of thought is the same for all, it must be something like logical form [Fodor, by Devlin] |
3010 | Belief and desire are structured states, which need mentalese [Fodor] |
2604 | We must have expressive power BEFORE we learn language [Fodor] |
12647 | Mental representations name things in the world, but also files in our memory [Fodor] |
12649 | We think in file names [Fodor] |
3135 | Is thought a syntactic computation using representations? [Fodor, by Rey] |
12655 | Frame Problem: how to eliminate most beliefs as irrelevant, without searching them? [Fodor] |
2983 | Maybe narrow content is physical, broad content less so [Lyons on Fodor] |
12615 | Mental representations are the old 'Ideas', but without images [Fodor] |
2437 | XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility [Fodor] |
12630 | If concept content is reference, then my Twin and I are referring to the same stuff [Fodor] |
3982 | How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor] |
2441 | Truth conditions require a broad concept of content [Fodor] |
2999 | Obsession with narrow content leads to various sorts of hopeless anti-realism [Fodor] |
3114 | Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff [Fodor] |
2486 | Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content [Fodor] |
3012 | Do identical thoughts have identical causal roles? [Fodor] |
2452 | Knowing the cause of a thought is almost knowing its content [Fodor] |
2432 | Is content basically information, fixed externally? [Fodor] |
12658 | Nobody knows how concepts are acquired [Fodor] |
2492 | Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience [Fodor] |
11143 | If concept-learning is hypothesis-testing, that needs innate concepts to get started [Fodor, by Margolis/Laurence] |
6650 | Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts [Fodor, by Lowe] |
12662 | We have an innate capacity to form a concept, once we have grasped the stereotype [Fodor] |
12618 | It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor] |
12635 | Having a concept isn't a pragmatic matter, but being able to think about the concept [Fodor] |
12652 | Concepts have two sides; they are files that face thought, and also face subject-matter [Fodor] |
2438 | In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions [Fodor] |
12614 | I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities [Fodor] |
2471 | Are concepts best seen as capacities? [Fodor] |
2472 | For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something [Fodor] |
12626 | Cartesians put concept individuation before concept possession [Fodor] |
12637 | Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference [Fodor] |
12638 | If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers [Fodor] |
12639 | Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes [Fodor] |
12654 | You can't think 'brown dog' without thinking 'brown' and 'dog' [Fodor] |
12621 | Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor] |
12622 | Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones [Fodor] |
12659 | Maybe stereotypes are a stage in concept acquisition (rather than a by-product) [Fodor] |
12660 | One stereotype might be a paradigm for two difference concepts [Fodor] |
12623 | The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are [Fodor] |
12629 | For the referential view of thought, the content of a concept is just its reference [Fodor] |
12631 | Compositionality requires that concepts be atomic [Fodor] |
12657 | Abstractionism claims that instances provide criteria for what is shared [Fodor] |
2439 | Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences [Fodor] |
2457 | If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs [Fodor] |
2998 | Grice thinks meaning is inherited from the propositional attitudes which sentences express [Fodor] |
2482 | It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states [Fodor] |
2451 | To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true [Fodor] |
3006 | Whatever in the mind delivers falsehood is parasitic on what delivers truth [Fodor] |
3007 | Many different verification procedures can reach 'star', but it only has one semantic value [Fodor] |
3004 | The meaning of a sentence derives from its use in expressing an attitude [Fodor] |
2433 | For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning [Fodor] |
2477 | If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end? [Fodor] |
3000 | Meaning holism is a crazy doctrine [Fodor] |
3003 | Very different mental states can share their contents, so content doesn't seem to be constructed from functional role [Fodor] |
12634 | 'Inferential-role semantics' says meaning is determined by role in inference [Fodor] |
2996 | Mental states may have the same content but different extensions [Fodor] |
12642 | Co-referring terms differ if they have different causal powers [Fodor] |
12663 | We refer to individuals and to properties, and we use singular terms and predicates [Fodor] |
2436 | It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth) [Fodor] |
12616 | English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts [Fodor] |
12645 | Semantics (esp. referential semantics) allows inferences from utterances to the world [Fodor] |
12646 | Semantics relates to the world, so it is never just psychological [Fodor] |
2434 | Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation [Fodor] |
2459 | Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is [Fodor] |
2473 | Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction [Fodor] |
2484 | The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work [Fodor] |
23878 | Weakness of will is the inadequacy of the original impetus to carry through the action [Weil] |
24184 | What matters about an action is not its aim, but the origin of its compulsion [Weil] |
12627 | Before you can plan action, you must decide on the truth of your estimate of success [Fodor] |
23899 | The secret of art is that beauty is a just blend of unity and its opposite [Weil] |
23832 | We both desire what is beautiful, and want it to remain as it is [Weil] |
23848 | The aesthete's treatment of beauty as amusement is sacreligious; beauty should nourish [Weil] |
23758 | Beauty is an attractive mystery, leaving nothing to be desired [Weil] |
23887 | Art (like philosophy) establishes a relation between world and self, and between oneself and others [Weil] |
24198 | Perfect works of art seem to be essentially anonymous [Weil] |
23903 | When we admire a work, we see ourselves as its creator [Weil] |
23898 | Those who say immorality is not an aesthetic criterion must show that all criteria are aesthetic [Weil] |
24216 | Everyone is devoted to morality, if they don't have to implement it [Weil] |
23854 | Beauty is the proof of what is good [Weil] |
23826 | Beauty, goodness and truth are only achieved by applying full attention [Weil] |
23814 | Every human yearns for an unattainable transcendent good [Weil] |
23824 | Where human needs are satisfied we find happiness, friendship and beauty [Weil] |
23879 | In a violent moral disagreement, it can't be that both sides are just following social morality [Weil] |
24191 | We want our values to be eternal [Weil] |
23882 | Ends, unlike means, cannot be defined, which is why people tend to pursue means [Weil] |
24197 | Power and money are supreme means, thus blinding people to ends [Weil] |
23760 | All we need are the unity of justice, truth and beauty [Weil] |
23883 | Minds essentially and always strive towards value [Weil] |
23748 | The sacred in every human is their expectation of good rather than evil [Weil] |
24181 | We need love to have a good death [Weil] |
23759 | Everything which originates in love is beautiful [Weil] |
24179 | We should never desire the immortality of the people we love [Weil] |
23762 | Evil is transmitted by comforts and pleasures, but mostly by doing harm to people [Weil] |
24193 | If we focus on the good, our whole soul is drawn towards it [Weil] |
23808 | There are two goods - the absolute good we want, and the reachable opposite of evil [Weil] |
23833 | The good is a nothingness, and yet real [Weil] |
23865 | Morality would improve if people could pursue private interests [Weil] |
24196 | Loving others as ourselves implies varied love, and varied suffering [Weil] |
23896 | We see our character as a restricting limit, but also as an unshakable support [Weil] |
23893 | We don't see character in a single moment, but only over a period of time [Weil] |
23894 | The concept of character is at the centre of morality [Weil] |
23895 | We modify our character by placing ourselves in situations, or by attending to what seems trivial [Weil] |
24183 | We should only perform the good actions which we can't help doing [Weil] |
23837 | Respect is our only obligation, which can only be expressed through deeds, not words [Weil] |
23815 | We cannot equally respect what is unequal, so equal respect needs a shared ground [Weil] |
24185 | Friendship is a virtue, not a state we should dream of [Weil] |
23834 | Friendship is partly universal - the love of a person is like the ideal of loving everyone [Weil] |
24219 | My neighbour's pleasure can't be an end for me [Weil] |
24188 | It is absurd to say that evil proves life is worthless. If it were, why would evil matter? [Weil] |
24205 | Monotony is beautiful as a reflection of eternity, or atrocious as unvarying perpetuity [Weil] |
23823 | Life needs risks to avoid sickly boredom [Weil] |
23844 | The most important human need is to have multiple roots [Weil] |
23838 | The need for order stands above all others, and is understood via the other needs [Weil] |
23836 | Obligations only bind individuals, not collectives [Weil] |
24202 | Obedience to an illegitimate ruler is a nightmare [Weil] |
24218 | People can't be citizens in public life if they are oppressed in economic life [Weil] |
23840 | A citizen should be able to understand the whole of society [Weil] |
23843 | Even the poorest should feel collective ownership, and participation in grand display [Weil] |
23822 | We all need to partipate in public tasks, and take some initiative [Weil] |
24200 | A citizen is defined by their subjection to the laws [Weil] |
23846 | Culture is an instrument for creating an ongoing succession of teachers [Weil] |
23866 | In oppressive societies the scope of actual control is extended by a religion of power [Weil] |
23812 | Force is what turns man into a thing, and ultimately into a corpse [Weil] |
24201 | Social order is equilibrium of forces, which must be corrected when imbalanced [Weil] |
24199 | There is no oppression, or oppressive class; there is only an oppressive society [Weil] |
23857 | People in power always try to increase their power [Weil] |
23831 | The essence of power is illusory prestige [Weil] |
23839 | A lifelong head of society should only be a symbol, not a ruler [Weil] |
23871 | No central authority can initiate decentralisation [Weil] |
23856 | Spontaneous movements are powerless against organised repression [Weil] |
23867 | After a bloody revolution the group which already had the power comes to the fore [Weil] |
24203 | Atheistic materialism must be revolutionary, because its good is in the future [Weil] |
23830 | A group is only dangerous if it endorses an abstract entity [Weil] |
23870 | Decentralisation is only possible by co-operation between strong and weak - which is absurd [Weil] |
23809 | Our only social duty is to try to limit evil [Weil] |
24190 | Anarchists thought (hopelessly) that empowering the oppressed would end evil [Weil] |
23817 | We need both equality (to attend to human needs) and hierarchy (as a scale of responsibilities) [Weil] |
23829 | National leaders want to preserve necessary order - but always the existing order [Weil] |
23842 | Party politics in a democracy can't avoid an anti-democratic party [Weil] |
23859 | True democracy is the subordination of society to the individual [Weil] |
23863 | Only individual people of good will can achieve social progress [Weil] |
23869 | In the least evil societies people can think, control community life, and be autonomous [Weil] |
23847 | Socialism tends to make a proletariat of the whole population [Weil] |
23750 | It is not more money which the wretched members of society need [Weil] |
23749 | The problem of the collective is not suppression of persons, but persons erasing themselves [Weil] |
23807 | The collective is the one and only object of false idolatry [Weil] |
23861 | Marx showed that capitalist oppression, because of competition, is unstoppable [Weil] |
23897 | Once money is the main aim, society needs everyone to think wealth is possible [Weil] |
23845 | The capitalists neglect the people and the nation, and even their own interests [Weil] |
23828 | National prestige consists of behaving as if you could beat the others in a war [Weil] |
23810 | Charity is the only love, and you can feel that for a country (a place with traditions), but not a nation [Weil] |
23811 | If effort is from necessity rather than for a good, it is slavery [Weil] |
23868 | The pleasure of completing tasks motivates just as well as the whip of slavery [Weil] |
23819 | Deliberate public lying should be punished [Weil] |
23818 | We have liberty in the space between nature and accepted authority [Weil] |
23901 | Relationships depend on equality, so unequal treatment kills them [Weil] |
23753 | People absurdly claim an equal share of things which are essentially privileged [Weil] |
24221 | Equality is the result of unlimited freedom [Weil] |
23841 | By making money the sole human measure, inequality has become universal [Weil] |
23864 | Inequality could easily be mitigated, if it were not for the struggle for power [Weil] |
23751 | Rights are asserted contentiously, and need the backing of force [Weil] |
23752 | Giving centrality to rights stifles all impulses of charity [Weil] |
23835 | People have duties, and only have rights because of the obligations of others to them [Weil] |
23820 | People need personal and collective property, and a social class lacking property is shameful [Weil] |
23813 | Only people who understand force, and don't respect it, are capable of justice [Weil] |
23757 | The spirit of justice needs the full attention of truth, and that attention is love [Weil] |
23761 | Justice (concerning harm) is distinct from rights (concerning inequality) [Weil] |
23852 | To punish people we must ourselves be innocent - but that undermines the desire to punish [Weil] |
23764 | The only thing in society worse than crime is repressive justice [Weil] |
23821 | Crime should be punished, to bring the perpetrator freely back to morality [Weil] |
23763 | Punishment aims at the good for men who don't desire it [Weil] |
23827 | Modern wars are fought in the name of empty words which are given capital letters [Weil] |
23880 | When war was a profession, customary morality justified any act of war [Weil] |
23850 | The soldier-civilian distinction should be abolished; every citizen is committed to a war [Weil] |
23858 | War is perpetuated by its continual preparations [Weil] |
23851 | Education is essentially motivation [Weil] |
23873 | Dividing history books into separate chapters is disastrous [Weil] |
24217 | History is scientific when it relies on accurate documents [Weil] |
23860 | Even if a drowning man is doomed, he should keep swimming to the last [Weil] |
3977 | Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances [Fodor] |
24204 | The past is known to us but unreachable - a perfect image of eternal, supernatural reality [Weil] |
24222 | If we ignore all our thoughts of the past and the future, there is nothing left of the present [Weil] |
24220 | As the highest value, God cannot be proved [Weil] |
23754 | The only choice is between supernatural good, or evil [Weil] |
23816 | Attention to a transcendent reality motivates a duty to foster the good of humanity [Weil] |
24192 | My love makes me believe in God; the inconceivability of this God makes me disbelieve [Weil] |
23892 | The only legitimate proof of God by order derives from beauty [Weil] |
23904 | The cruelty of the Old Testament put me off Christianity [Weil] |
24178 | We must leave on one side the ordinary 'consolations' of religion [Weil] |
24206 | Revolution (not religion) is the opium of the people [Weil] |
23849 | Religion should quietly suffuse all human life with its light [Weil] |
23902 | I attach little importance to immortality, which is an undecidable fact, and irrelevant to us [Weil] |
24180 | We just see immortality as prolongation of life, making death meaningless [Weil] |
23765 | The soul is the intrinsic value of a human [Weil] |
24186 | If the world lacked evil, then the evil would be in our desires, which would be worse [Weil] |
24187 | Without worldly affliction, we'd think this is paradise [Weil] |