13 ideas
| 5831 | The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP] |
| 18270 | Choice suggests that intensions are not needed to ensure classes [Coffa] |
| 5829 | We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP] |
| 5830 | The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP] |
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 18263 | The semantic tradition aimed to explain the a priori semantically, not by Kantian intuition [Coffa] |
| 18272 | Platonism defines the a priori in a way that makes it unknowable [Coffa] |
| 18266 | Mathematics generalises by using variables [Coffa] |
| 5826 | The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP] |
| 18279 | Relativity is as absolutist about space-time as Newton was about space [Coffa] |