33 ideas
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 18680 | To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 22858 | There is collective action, where a trend is manifest, but is not attributable to individuals [Lukes] |
| 18684 | Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi] |
| 18666 | Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi] |
| 18667 | The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi] |
| 18685 | Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi] |
| 18679 | Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi] |
| 18682 | A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi] |
| 18683 | Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi] |
| 18686 | The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi] |
| 18672 | Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi] |
| 18677 | A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi] |
| 18668 | Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi] |
| 18670 | The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi] |
| 18669 | Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi] |
| 22850 | Hidden powers are the most effective [Lukes] |
| 22852 | The pluralist view says that power is restrained by group rivalry [Lukes] |
| 22854 | Power is a capacity, which may never need to be exercised [Lukes] |
| 22857 | The two-dimensional view of power recognises the importance of controlling the agenda [Lukes] |
| 22855 | One-dimensionsal power is behaviour in observable conflicts of interests [Lukes] |
| 22856 | Political organisation brings some conflicts to the fore, and suppresses others [Lukes] |
| 22860 | The evidence for the exertion of power need not involve a grievance of the powerless [Lukes] |
| 22861 | Power is affecting a person in a way contrary to their interests [Lukes] |
| 22863 | Power is the capacity of a social class to realise its interests [Lukes] |
| 21133 | Supreme power is getting people to have thoughts and desires chosen by you [Lukes] |
| 22859 | Power can be exercised to determine a person's desires [Lukes] |
| 22851 | In the 1950s they said ideology is finished, and expertise takes over [Lukes] |
| 22862 | Liberals take people as they are, and take their preferences to be their interests [Lukes] |
| 22853 | Anyone who thinks capitalism can improve their lives is endorsing capitalism [Lukes] |