Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, T.H. Green and Michael Smith

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51 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Ideals and metaphysics are practical, not imaginative or speculative [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Truth is a relation to a whole of organised knowledge in the collection of rational minds [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
All knowledge rests on a fundamental unity between the knower and what is known [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
The ultimate test for truth is the systematic interdependence in nature [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
Knowledge is secured by the relations between its parts, through differences and identities [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M]
A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M]
A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M]
In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M]
Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M]
Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M]
If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M]
Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M]
Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M]
We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M]
A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
The good life aims at perfections, or absolute laws, or what is absolutely desirable [Green,TH]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M]
'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
What is distinctive of human life is the desire for self-improvement [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
Hedonism offers no satisfaction, because what we desire is self-betterment [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / a. Sovereignty
States only have full authority if they heed the claims of human fellowship [Green,TH]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
Politics is compromises, which seem supported by a social contract, but express the will of no one [Green,TH]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
The ideal is a society in which all citizens are ladies and gentlemen [Green,TH]
Enfranchisement is an end in itself; it makes a person moral, and gives a basis for respect [Green,TH]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
The good is identified by the capacities of its participants [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
A true state is only unified and stabilised by acknowledging individuality [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / c. Liberal equality
People are improved by egalitarian institutions and habits [Green,TH]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
Equality also implies liberty, because equality must be of opportunity as well as possessions [Green,TH]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / e. Liberal community
All talk of the progress of a nation must reduce to the progress of its individual members [Green,TH]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
People only develop their personality through co-operation with the social whole [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
The highest political efforts express our deeper social spirit [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
Communism is wrong because it restricts the freedom of individuals to contribute to the community [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
Original common ownership is securing private property, not denying it [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 14. Nationalism
National spirit only exists in the individuals who embody it [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
The ground of property ownership is not force but the power to use it for social ends [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
Property is needed by all citizens, to empower them to achieve social goods [Green,TH]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
If something develops, its true nature is embodied in its end [Green,TH]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 1. God
God is the ideal end of the mature mind's final development [Green,TH]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
God is the realisation of the possibilities of each man's self [Green,TH]