185 ideas
| 22115 | Wise people should contemplate and discuss the truth, and fight against falsehood [Aquinas] |
| 22101 | Philosophy aims to know the truth about the way things are [Aquinas] |
| 23657 | The existence of tensed verbs shows that not all truths are necessary truths [Reid] |
| 1848 | We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence [Aquinas] |
| 1858 | The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths [Aquinas] |
| 21267 | Supposing many principles is superfluous if a few will do it [Aquinas] |
| 22102 | Arguing with opponents uncovers truths, and restrains falsehoods [Aquinas] |
| 13070 | If definitions must be general, and general terms can't individuate, then Socrates can't be defined [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 11197 | The definitions expressing identity are used to sort things [Aquinas] |
| 23655 | An ad hominem argument is good, if it is shown that the man's principles are inconsistent [Reid] |
| 23176 | Truth is universal, but knowledge of it is not [Aquinas] |
| 20621 | Types of lying: Speak lies, intend lies, intend deception, aim at deceptive goal? [Aquinas, by Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 1852 | For the mind Good is one truth among many, and Truth is one good among many [Aquinas] |
| 21248 | If the existence of truth is denied, the 'Truth does not exist' must be true! [Aquinas] |
| 22104 | Truth is the conformity of being to intellect [Aquinas] |
| 23173 | If a syllogism admits one absurdity, others must follow [Aquinas] |
| 23634 | Accepting the existence of anything presupposes the notion of existence [Reid] |
| 11195 | If affirmative propositions express being, we affirm about what is absent [Aquinas] |
| 22103 | Being is basic to thought, and all other concepts are additions to being [Aquinas] |
| 15812 | Being implies distinctness, which implies division, unity, and multitude [Aquinas] |
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 21268 | Non-human things are explicable naturally, and voluntary things by the will, so God is not needed [Aquinas] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16655 | Different genera are delimited by modes of predication, which rest on modes of being [Aquinas] |
| 16641 | Whiteness does not exist, but by it something can exist-as-white [Aquinas] |
| 11201 | Properties have an incomplete essence, with definitions referring to their subject [Aquinas] |
| 23664 | Powers are quite distinct and simple, and so cannot be defined [Reid] |
| 23669 | Thinkers say that matter has intrinsic powers, but is also passive and acted upon [Reid] |
| 23666 | It is obvious that there could not be a power without a subject which possesses it [Reid] |
| 23651 | Universals are not objects of sense and cannot be imagined - but can be conceived [Reid] |
| 11205 | If the form of 'human' contains 'many', Socrates isn't human; if it contains 'one', Socrates is Plato [Aquinas] |
| 23650 | Only individuals exist [Reid] |
| 23649 | No one thinks two sheets possess a single whiteness, but all agree they are both white [Reid] |
| 13090 | The principle of diversity for corporeal substances is their matter [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 17555 | 'One' can mean undivided and not a multitude, or it can add measurement, giving number [Aquinas] |
| 16765 | Humans only have a single substantial form, which contains the others and acts for them [Aquinas] |
| 16766 | One thing needs a single thing to unite it; if there were two forms, something must unite them [Aquinas] |
| 11202 | It is by having essence that things exist [Aquinas] |
| 11203 | Specific individual essence is defined by material, and generic essence is defined by form [Aquinas] |
| 11200 | The definition of a physical object must include the material as well as the form [Aquinas] |
| 23647 | Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid] |
| 11196 | Essence is something in common between the natures which sort things into categories [Aquinas] |
| 11208 | A simple substance is its own essence [Aquinas] |
| 1350 | Continuity is needed for existence, otherwise we would say a thing existed after it ceased to exist [Reid] |
| 21322 | We treat slowly changing things as identical for the sake of economy in language [Reid] |
| 21320 | Identity is familiar to common sense, but very hard to define [Reid] |
| 1367 | Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence [Reid] |
| 11874 | Real identity admits of no degrees [Reid] |
| 11958 | Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar] |
| 22170 | Senses grasp external properties, but the understanding grasps the essential natures of things [Aquinas] |
| 23175 | The conclusions of speculative reason about necessities are certain [Aquinas] |
| 23659 | If someone denies that he is thinking when he is conscious of it, we can only laugh [Reid] |
| 21337 | A knowing being possesses a further reality, the 'presence' of the thing known [Aquinas] |
| 23662 | The existence of ideas is no more obvious than the existence of external objects [Reid] |
| 23661 | We are only aware of other beings through our senses; without that, we are alone in the universe [Reid] |
| 21249 | Some things are self-evident to us; others are only self-evident in themselves [Aquinas] |
| 23635 | Truths are self-evident to sensible persons who understand them clearly without prejudice [Reid] |
| 22169 | Initial universal truths are present within us as potential, to be drawn out by reason [Aquinas] |
| 21250 | A proposition is self-evident if the predicate is included in the essence of the subject [Aquinas] |
| 7631 | Sensation is not committed to any external object, but perception is [Reid] |
| 23637 | Primary qualities are the object of mathematics [Reid] |
| 23638 | Secondary qualities conjure up, and are confused with, the sensations which produce them [Reid] |
| 22168 | Minds take in a likeness of things, which activates an awaiting potential [Aquinas] |
| 23639 | It is unclear whether a toothache is in the mind or in the tooth, but the word has a single meaning [Reid] |
| 20224 | Sensation prepares the way for intellectual knowledge, which needs the virtues of reason [Aquinas] |
| 1860 | Knowledge may be based on senses, but we needn't sense all our knowledge [Aquinas] |
| 6492 | Reid is seen as the main direct realist of the eighteenth century [Reid, by Robinson,H] |
| 23633 | Many truths seem obvious, and point to universal agreement - which is what we find [Reid] |
| 23654 | In obscure matters the few must lead the many, but the many usually lead in common sense [Reid] |
| 23644 | Without memory we could have no concept of duration [Reid] |
| 23643 | We all trust our distinct memories (but not our distinct imaginings) [Reid] |
| 23660 | The theory of ideas, popular with philosophers, means past existence has to be proved [Reid] |
| 23641 | People dislike believing without evidence, and try to avoid it [Reid] |
| 22109 | The fullest knowledge places a conclusion within an accurate theory [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump] |
| 23642 | If non-rational evidence reaches us, it is reason which then makes use of it [Reid] |
| 23549 | We treat testimony with a natural trade off of belief and caution [Reid, by Fricker,M] |
| 11198 | Definition of essence makes things understandable [Aquinas] |
| 1356 | A person is a unity, and doesn't come in degrees [Reid] |
| 23658 | Consciousness is an indefinable and unique operation [Reid] |
| 23665 | Consciousness is the power of mind to know itself, and minds are grounded in powers [Reid] |
| 22107 | Sensations are transmitted to 'internal senses' in the brain, chiefly to 'phantasia' and 'imagination' [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump] |
| 9098 | Mental activity combines what we sense with imagination of what is not present [Aquinas] |
| 9092 | Abstracting A from B generates truth, as long as the connection is not denied [Aquinas] |
| 9093 | We understand the general nature of things by ignoring individual peculiarities [Aquinas] |
| 9097 | The mind abstracts generalities from images, but also uses images for understanding [Aquinas] |
| 9095 | Very general ideas (being, oneness, potentiality) can be abstracted from thought matter in general [Aquinas] |
| 9099 | Particular instances come first, and (pace Plato) generalisations are abstracted from them [Aquinas] |
| 10508 | Species are abstracted from appearances by ignoring individual conditions [Aquinas] |
| 1359 | Personal identity is the basis of all rights, obligations and responsibility [Reid] |
| 21319 | I can hardly care about rational consequence if it wasn't me conceiving the antecedent [Reid] |
| 21323 | The identity of a thief is only known by similarity, but memory gives certainty in our own case [Reid] |
| 21321 | Memory reveals my past identity - but so does testimony of other witnesses [Reid] |
| 21324 | If consciousness is transferable 20 persons can be 1; forgetting implies 1 can be 20 [Reid] |
| 21325 | Boy same as young man, young man same as old man, old man not boy, if forgotten! [Reid] |
| 21327 | If a stolen horse is identified by similitude, its identity is not therefore merely similitude [Reid] |
| 1366 | If consciousness is personal identity, it is continually changing [Reid] |
| 1352 | Thoughts change continually, but the self doesn't [Reid] |
| 22111 | Aquinas attributes freedom to decisions and judgements, and not to the will alone [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump] |
| 23681 | The first motion or effect cannot be produced necessarily, so the First Cause must be a free agent [Reid] |
| 23676 | A willed action needs reasonable understanding of what is to be done [Reid] |
| 1855 | If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it [Aquinas] |
| 1856 | Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable [Aquinas] |
| 1862 | However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit [Aquinas] |
| 1849 | Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them [Aquinas] |
| 23668 | Our own nature attributes free determinations to our own will [Reid] |
| 23680 | We are morally free, because we experience it, we are accountable, and we pursue projects [Reid] |
| 1861 | The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it [Aquinas] |
| 1853 | Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will [Aquinas] |
| 1854 | We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will [Aquinas] |
| 22105 | The human intellectual soul is an incorporeal, subsistent principle [Aquinas] |
| 20700 | Without God's influence every operation would stop, so God causes everything [Aquinas] |
| 23652 | We must first conceive things before we can consider them [Reid] |
| 22108 | First grasp what it is, then its essential features; judgement is their compounding and division [Aquinas] |
| 23656 | The structure of languages reveals a uniformity in basic human opinions [Reid] |
| 23630 | Only philosophers treat ideas as objects [Reid] |
| 10503 | We abstract forms from appearances, and acquire knowledge of immaterial things [Aquinas] |
| 10509 | Understanding consists entirely of grasping abstracted species [Aquinas] |
| 23648 | First we notice and name attributes ('abstracting'); then we notice that subjects share them ('generalising') [Reid] |
| 10506 | Mathematics can be abstracted from sensible matter, and from individual intelligible matter [Aquinas] |
| 23653 | If you can't distinguish the features of a complex object, your notion of it would be a muddle [Reid] |
| 23640 | Only mature minds can distinguish the qualities of a body [Reid] |
| 9094 | Mathematical objects abstract both from perceived matter, and from particular substance [Aquinas] |
| 10505 | We can just think of an apple's colour, because the apple is not part of the colour's nature [Aquinas] |
| 10504 | Abstracting either treats something as separate, or thinks of it separately [Aquinas] |
| 10507 | Numbers and shapes are abstracted by ignoring their sensible qualities [Aquinas] |
| 9096 | The mind must produce by its own power an image of the individual species [Aquinas] |
| 23629 | The ambiguity of words impedes the advancement of knowledge [Reid] |
| 23646 | Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description [Reid] |
| 23645 | A word's meaning is the thing conceived, as fixed by linguistic experts [Reid] |
| 11206 | The mind constructs complete attributions, based on the unified elements of the real world [Aquinas] |
| 1847 | The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means [Aquinas] |
| 1857 | We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it [Aquinas] |
| 1846 | The will can only want what it thinks is good [Aquinas] |
| 23180 | The will is the rational appetite [Aquinas] |
| 20051 | Reid said that agent causation is a unique type of causation [Reid, by Stout,R] |
| 23678 | A motive is merely an idea, like advice, and not a force for action [Reid] |
| 23663 | There are axioms of taste - such as a general consensus about a beautiful face [Reid] |
| 1850 | Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming [Aquinas] |
| 22112 | For humans good is accordance with reason, and bad is contrary to reason [Aquinas] |
| 22494 | We must know the end, know that it is the end, and know how to attain it [Aquinas] |
| 1851 | Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind [Aquinas] |
| 23674 | If an attempted poisoning results in benefits, we still judge the agent a poisoner [Reid] |
| 23675 | We shouldn't do to others what would be a wrong to us in similar circumstances [Reid] |
| 23181 | All acts of virtue relate to justice, which is directed towards the common good [Aquinas] |
| 23672 | To be virtuous, we must care about duty [Reid] |
| 8009 | Aquinas wanted, not to escape desire, but to transform it for moral ends [Aquinas, by MacIntyre] |
| 23182 | Legal justice is supreme, because it directs the other virtues to the common good [Aquinas] |
| 22399 | Temperance prevents our passions from acting against reason [Aquinas] |
| 23177 | Justice directs our relations with others, because it denotes a kind of equality [Aquinas] |
| 23673 | Every worthy man has a principle of honour, and knows what is honourable [Reid] |
| 23179 | People differ in their social degrees, and a particular type of right applies to each [Aquinas] |
| 23174 | Natural law is a rational creature's participation in eternal law [Aquinas] |
| 22113 | Right and wrong actions pertain to natural law, as perceived by practical reason [Aquinas] |
| 22114 | Tyrannical laws are irrational, and so not really laws [Aquinas] |
| 7291 | For Aquinas a war must be in a just cause, have proper authority, and aim at good [Aquinas, by Grayling] |
| 5508 | Aquinas says a fertilized egg is not human, and has no immortal soul [Aquinas, by Martin/Barresi] |
| 16687 | Bodies are three-dimensional substances [Aquinas] |
| 23632 | Similar effects come from similar causes, and causes are only what are sufficient for the effects [Reid] |
| 11207 | A cause can exist without its effect, but the effect cannot exist without its cause [Aquinas] |
| 8383 | Day and night are constantly conjoined, but they don't cause one another [Reid, by Crane] |
| 23677 | We all know that mere priority or constant conjunction do not have to imply causation [Reid] |
| 23667 | Regular events don't imply a cause, without an innate conviction of universal causation [Reid] |
| 1859 | Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process [Aquinas] |
| 23679 | The principle of the law of nature is that matter is passive, and is acted upon [Reid] |
| 23670 | Scientists don't know the cause of magnetism, and only discover its regulations [Reid] |
| 23671 | Laws are rules for effects, but these need a cause; rules of navigation don't navigate [Reid] |
| 15202 | Eternity coexists with passing time, as the centre of a circle coexists with its circumference [Aquinas] |
| 23178 | Divine law commands some things because they are good, while others are good because commanded [Aquinas] |
| 21251 | We can't know God's essence, so his existence can't be self-evident for us [Aquinas] |
| 5614 | If you assume that there must be a necessary being, you can't say which being has this quality [Kant on Aquinas] |
| 21269 | Way 1: the infinite chain of potential-to-actual movement has to have a first mover [Aquinas] |
| 21270 | Way 2: no effect without a cause, and this cannot go back to infinity, so there is First Cause [Aquinas] |
| 21271 | Way 3: contingent beings eventually vanish, so continuity needs a necessary being [Aquinas] |
| 21272 | Way 4: the source of all qualities is their maximum, so something (God) causes all perfections [Aquinas] |
| 21273 | Way 5: mindless things act towards an obvious end, so there is an intelligent director [Aquinas] |
| 20211 | Life aims at the Beatific Vision - of perfect happiness, and revealed truth [Aquinas, by Zagzebski] |
| 22106 | Aquinas saw angels as separated forms, rather than as made of 'spiritual matter' [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump] |
| 16711 | Heretics should be eradicated like wolves [Aquinas] |
| 23306 | Humans have a non-physical faculty of reason, so they can be immortal [Aquinas, by Sorabji] |
| 1863 | If the soul achieves well-being in another life, it doesn't follow that I do [Aquinas] |
| 4412 | Those in bliss have their happiness increased by seeing the damned punished [Aquinas] |
| 21266 | God does not exist, because He is infinite and good, and so no evil should be discoverable [Aquinas] |
| 21274 | It is part of God's supreme goodness that He brings good even out of evil [Aquinas] |