11 ideas
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
15148 | Powers give explanations, without being necessary for some class membership [Chakravartty] |
15145 | A kind essence is the necessary and sufficient properties for membership of a class [Chakravartty] |
15147 | Cluster kinds are explained simply by sharing some properties, not by an 'essence' [Chakravartty] |
14280 | The probability of two events is the first probability times the second probability assuming the first [Bayes] |
15144 | Explanation of causal phenomena concerns essential kinds - but also lack of them [Chakravartty] |
15146 | Some kinds, such as electrons, have essences, but 'cluster kinds' do not [Chakravartty] |
15151 | Many causal laws do not refer to kinds, but only to properties [Chakravartty] |