Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Tim Bayne and Miranda Fricker

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18 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
16062 A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16061 If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
16060 Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
16064 The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
23551 It is necessary for a belief that it be held for a length of time [Fricker,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
23558 Offering knowledge needs accuracy and sincerity; receiving it needs testimonial justice [Fricker,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
17771 How we evaluate evidence depends on our background beliefs [Bayne]
17770 Clifford's dictum seems to block our beliefs in morality, politics and philosophy [Bayne]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
23550 Burge says we are normally a priori entitled to believe testimony [Fricker,M]
23552 We assess testimonial probabilities by the speaker, the listener, the facts, and the circumstances [Fricker,M]
23553 Testimonial judgement is not logical, but produces reasons and motivations [Fricker,M]
23555 Assessing credibility involves the impact of both the speaker's and the listener's social identity [Fricker,M]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
17766 Physicalism correlates brain and mind, explains causation by thought, and makes nature continuous [Bayne]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
23554 Judgements can be unreflective and non-inferential, yet rational, by being sensitive to experience [Fricker,M]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 8. Human Thought
17768 Perception reveals what animals think, but humans can disengage thought from perception [Bayne]
17769 Some people centre space on themselves; others centre space on the earth [Bayne]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
17767 The alternative to a language of thought is map-like or diagram-like thought [Bayne]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
23557 To judge agents in remote times and cultures we need a moral resentment weaker than blame [Fricker,M]